

Businessmen and Municipal Reform: A Study of Ideals and Practice in San Jose and Santa Cruz, 1896-1916



Edited by David W. Eakins

Sourisseau Academy for California State and Local History • San Jose State University
Original Research in Santa Clara County History • Student Publication NO.1, 1976



SOURISSEAU ACADEMY

Robert E. Levinson
Director

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Clyde Arbuckle
Peter M. Buzanski
Benjamin F. Gilbert
Ted C. Hinckley
Billie B. Jensen
Jerome B. Munday
Peter Rodriguez
Lynn Vermillion
James P. Walsh
Austen Warburton
Gerald E. Wheeler

EMERITUS TRUSTEES

Laurence Bulmore
Charles B. Burdick
Theron Fox
Benjamin H. Hazard
Lawrence B. Lee
Feliciano Rivera

Carolyn de Vries
Executive Secretary

Forward

The Sourisseau Academy for California State and Local History of San Jose State University takes pride in presenting its first number in a projected series, "Original Research in Santa Clara County History – Student Publications."

The essays in this publication, edited by Professor David W. Eakins, represent some of the best student research and writing that has taken place on this university campus on the subject of California and local history. Congratulations are in order to Professor Eakins for all his efforts on behalf of student scholarship in the History Department.

The Sourisseau Academy intends to continue this publication program, and we look forward to more such presentations in the near future.

Robert E. Levinson
Associate Professor of History
Director of the Sourisseau Academy

Preface

The essays in this volume are the fruits of a special project undertaken by the students of a graduate United States history seminar at San Jose State University on Spring, 1973. The seminar members decided to make a case study of Progressivism – concentrating on Progressive Era municipal reform in San Jose and Santa Cruz and using local research sources. The study is an introduction to the topic and is not intended to be the final word. Nevertheless, despite such limitations as the time available for the project and the incompleteness of some of the record (the scarcity of material about – or by – the opponents of reform, themselves, for example), we believe this study sheds valuable light on some of the background to present San Jose and its institutions.

The work was jointly done in several senses. We had many discussions in the course of the research and writing in which we shared criticisms, ideas and concepts, sources (and blind alleys), and – not least – real pleasure and enthusiasm. The cooperation of others made the outcome possible. We wish especially to thank the following: Eugene Gilbert, a volunteer worker at the San Jose Historical Museum; Dennis R. Peterson, the former Curator, John B. Dowty, the former Director, and Donald DeMers, the current Director of the San Jose Historical Museum, who has been helpful in providing materials for use in the final preparation of this volume; Rita Bottoms, Director of Special Collections at the University of California, Santa Cruz, Library; Samuel Leask III; Gordon Sinclair, Managing Editor of the *Santa Cruz Sentinel*; Mrs. A. Mellon, City Clerk of Santa Cruz, and her staff; the Director and other members of the Sourisseau Academy for much help and forbearance; and Nancy Favier, Designer, and Doris Gilbert, Artist, San Jose State University Publications, for unusual dedication to their craft.

David W. Eakins

All photographs courtesy of the San Jose Historical Museum.



Table of Contents

Introduction By David W. Eakins	2
The Discovery of Corruption as a Public Issue: The Good Government League and the Machine in San Jose 1896-1902 By John Herberich and Patricia K. Cannon	4
The Worswick Reformers and "The Push," 1902-1904 By Richard C. Wakefield	8
Centralization and Efficiency: The Reformers Shape Modern San Jose Government, 1910-1916 By Valeria Ellsworth and Andrew J. Garbely	12
The Temperate Progressives of Santa Cruz, 1906-1916 By Philip Wright and Jon Gundersgaard	18
Footnotes	20
The Authors	22

Introduction

David W. Eakins

Beginning in the 1890s many American communities suddenly awoke to the evils of "bossism" and corruption in municipal government. This was a national phenomenon that affected San Jose and Santa Cruz no less than many other towns across the country. The evils themselves were nothing new on the American urban scene, but they were now, for some reason, intolerable to growing numbers of local leading citizens.

As historian Samuel Hays and others have noted, it is not sufficient to view municipal reform simply as a battle between the forces of "honesty" and "corruption" even though that is the way reformers described the events themselves. What distinguished the emerging Progressives from the old guard machine politicians was not idealism as opposed to purchaseable pragmatism. The reformers, too, could make deals with the bosses. What was new in many American towns were new economic forces, and a new set of ideas in response to those forces, that rendered what once had been acceptable political practice now insupportable. Corruption had become too expensive. None of this is to say that the rhetoric of idealism and civic morality was insincere, nor even that it was not deeply believed by the reformers. But to understand what moved these people it is necessary to go beyond their own evaluation of themselves and their works. In other words, what did they *do*? Who were they? What specific practices did they, in fact, eliminate? What positive changes did they introduce? What concrete benefits resulted from their positive reforms? Who benefitted? and who opposed the reforms? Some of these are difficult questions. In applying them to events in San Jose and Santa Cruz the authors of the essays in this volume have not always provided complete answers. But despite the limitations of time and research materials a number of conclusions can safely be drawn.

The usual pattern of municipal reform elsewhere in the United States was reproduced in San Jose and, in part, in Santa Cruz. City government was centralized. Local ward representation was replaced by the city-wide election of councilmen. The powers of the elected mayor were increasingly whittled away, and then virtually eliminated with the provision for the appointment of an urban efficiency expert—the city manager. Thus, not only was direct local democracy diminished by the removal of ward autonomy, but the major city policy maker was placed beyond the reach of city voters. To be sure, the reformers introduced some of the Progressive Era mechanisms of "direct democracy" in the initiative, referendum, and recall. But these measures were minor appendages to a larger design. They seem to have been added for the sake of gaining voter consent to a *system* of centralized control. In San Jose, for example, the city manager who was the most powerful city official, was carefully excluded from recall by the voters.

The reformers came from a narrow spectrum of the population. In San Jose and Santa Cruz they were almost exclusively leading members of the business community. Later, in San Jose, some women were involved, but the reform movement was initiated and carried forward, for the most part, by younger, up-coming businessmen. Nearly all were Republicans. Democrats had little part in the struggle. The main contest was between machine Republicans and reform Republicans. The leading reform organizations were also composed of businessmen. San Jose's turn-of-the-century Good Government League, for example, consisted of a highly disciplined group of businessmen and "orchardists." It was led by two men who functioned in both occupations and who soon acquired the two major newspapers in town. A decade later it was the Chamber of Commerce that became an important initiator of reform.

Why did some of the biggest *businessmen* become reformers? After all, as Lincoln Steffens charged in his angry book, *The Shame of the Cities*, in 1904, it was the dominance of business values in American political life that was responsible for the corruption of city politics. Bribery and graft were business expenses willingly paid for business control of politics. "The typical businessman," Steffens asserted, "is a bad citizen." If so, why was the reform of city politics in so many cities led by those same businessmen? Why, specifically, did San Jose reformers become openly outraged by the very corruption they had once learned to live with? To say that the

outrage was a product of a new morality is a circular argument that is obviously true, but unhelpful. It sheds no light on the causes of the new attitudes. Without disputing the plain fact of the new morality and its significance we must look first at the changing nature of the American city on the national scene as a whole; at the new demands for municipal services; and then we must ask why the old politics inhibited—most of all for businessmen—the full realization of economic benefits from those innovations.

In the 1890s a new technology was developed in the United States that provided the basis for new national economic growth. That technology—in particular, electricity and the automobile—changed the face of urban America. The new inventions rapidly became central to American economic and social life. Electric lights, appliances, telephones, streetcars, and motor vehicles brought jobs and profits for city dwellers, but it was up to city government to provide most of the means by which those inventions could be utilized. It was the responsibility of city politicians to provide paved and lighted streets for the automobile, and tracks and right-of-way and electricity for the "street railways." Moreover, the new technology did not creep into the American town; it came in a rush. For example, the plant and equipment value of the electrical light and power industry in the United States was \$96 million in 1895. It doubled in value about every five years thereafter. By 1917 the industry was valued at over two billion dollars. The street and electric railways grew at a similarly impressive pace, with a plant and equipment value of \$430 million in 1895 and \$2.6 billion in 1917. The value of electric household appliances and supplies was about \$2.4 million in 1900 and nearly \$59 million in 1917. The most spectacular growth, however, was in the automotive industry. In 1900 there were eight thousand motor vehicles registered in the United States; in 1910, nearly half a million; and by 1917 over five million. In 1890 the outstanding highway debt of all the states was only \$11,000. By 1917 it stood at \$154 million. But despite this growing state responsibility, it was the American towns and cities that financed most of the new paved roads. At the close of the Progressive Era American municipalities were spending about a third of a billion dollars a year for city streets.²

The demands of the new technology upon city government in the Progressive Era were enormous—assuming, that is, that local politicians desired that technology for their communities. The point is, however, they really had little choice—not even in those American towns like San Jose whose basic wealth was derived at least indirectly from agriculture. American cities and towns could not, even had they wished to do so, opt out of a capitalist political economy. Commerce and industry provided an increasing percentage of America's jobs and incomes and tax revenues. Thus the centrality of the urban businessman in the economic hence the *political* life of American towns. But the businessman was central to the urban political economy in another way that compelled many businessmen to become reformers. American capitalism not only depended on commerce and industry for most jobs and wealth, but it also depended upon the creation and widespread adoption of new technology for the continued health of that commerce and industry. It was the businessman in particular who was the most driven by the anticipated rewards of new technology. And businessmen demanded that American towns make use of that technology. Without it, local business would stagnate in the face of the acceptance of progress elsewhere. And such a state of affairs was simply inconceivable.

City governments everywhere responded to the needs of leading citizens. But to do so, governments had, first of all, to find new sources of revenue to build the unprecedentedly expensive new facilities. The tax rate for individual taxpayers could be—and was—raised. But a far more palatable course was to increase the overall tax *base*, which could be accomplished merely by annexing outlying populated areas to the central community, or, with more difficulty, by attracting new residents and new business to town. Another means of finding new funds was to demand an end to the inefficient spending of existing city governments. The intensifying demands upon local governments made by their leading citizens

brought efficiency into the forefront of Progressive reform ideas. Political corruption had always been inefficient and wasteful of resources. But machine governments existed by virtue of their ability to respond to special interests. The cost of bribery was an extra burden on all taxpayers. But if particular businessmen could receive benefits from the machine, or if other local citizens retained a significant, although lesser, voice through the power of their votes in the wards, then the price of inefficiency could be borne. In fact, as many recent historians have commented, the city boss or the political machine allowed for a real—if rough and skewed—sort of direct democracy. And the demands, at least of businessmen, were not so much for municipal services as they were for a kind of *laissez-faire* protection or, more positively, for access to special opportunity. But demands for a new degree and new kinds of city services rendered the inefficiency of old-style bossism too much to bear. It was one thing to extend expensive favors to special interests but when tax money was spent for streets that somehow never received surfacing (and thus could not well accommodate automobiles) or for streetcar tracks that did not go downtown, or for electrical facilities that were impossibly expensive then that was quite something else in an age when such improvements were crucial to economic life itself. Corruption, both in politics and morals, became much too expensive when it prevented economic expansion in general and caused people and commerce to locate elsewhere. The achievement of efficiency, then, came to be both the central tactic and ideology of a movement for reform in city government that was led by a group of newly angry and righteous businessmen.

The authors of this study demonstrate that San Jose was no exception to the foregoing generalizations about the national scene. (Santa Cruz has a somewhat different, but no less illuminating, history.) The concerns of San Jose reformers from 1896 to 1916 were centered, again and again, on the failure to attract new commerce; on the growth-inhibiting tax levels; on the failure to encourage new construction; on the lack of roads and efficient rail service; on the stultifying cost of corruption and inefficiency in every basic municipal service.


The leaders of reform in San Jose also worried that their town would fall behind the rest of the state in seizing new opportunities that seemed to be coming uniquely to Californians. People were moving to California in increasing numbers in the Progressive Era. San Jose leaders hoped to share in the growth. They particularly anticipated the Pacific Basin trade opportunities that would be

created in the Bay Area by the opening of the Panama Canal.

Despite some advances, the pressure for municipal "progress" was unrelenting throughout the Progressive Era in San Jose. The reformers were justified in their repeated claims that San Jose was not so appealing to newcomers as were other parts of the state. The national population grew about 60 percent between 1890 and 1920, but California nearly tripled its population. The most dramatic growth came after the turn of the century, especially in the second decade. But San Jose could not match that rate of increase. While its population did nearly double between 1896 and 1920 much of that increase (and precisely in the second decade) came from the annexation of already populated areas.³

If San Jose did not fare so well comparatively, the leaders of its municipal reform movement claimed other successes. By 1916 San Jose municipal government was made efficient according to the reform standard of the time. That is, city government was modelled on the lines of business efficiency. The social costs of that change, however, were not fully apparent at the time, not even to the opponents of reform. Nearly everyone accepted the model of business-like efficiency because nearly everyone assumed that that notion had to do merely with the form or mode of governing. But such was never the case. The concept embodied a qualitative change in the very nature of government; that is in its very ends and purposes. An analogy often used by reformers in San Jose and elsewhere was that the "urban corporation" was directed by experts in the same manner as a business corporation was administered by its board of directors. But, then as now, the example connotes more than technique. Efficiency, both in theory and especially in practice, meant heeding some citizens and not others. The reformers believed—to continue their own analogy—that the customers of the corporation were not experts and their participation in the making of corporation policy must, in the name of efficiency, be limited. The average voter was the "shareholder" in the urban corporation who allowed the experts, that is, the city-manager "president" with the help of the city council "board of directors," to make all corporate decisions in his name and without his wasteful intervention. In the name of efficiency the citizens of San Jose were detached from their former relationship to the making of city political decisions. Which is to say that reform in San Jose resulted in greater efficiency, supposedly, but the cost of greater efficiency was less democracy. Neither the average citizen nor the authors of municipal reform in San Jose were aware that they were choosing one in preference to the other.

San Jose Mercury, April 30, 1902, Page One



THE HAND OF DECENCY FORCES "JOHNNY" TO HIS DOOM.

The Discovery of Corruption as a Public Issue: The Good Government League and the Machine in San Jose 1896-1902

John Herberich and Patricia K. Cannon


THE DEFEAT OF THE BOSS IS ASSURED



Monster Meeting at the Auditorium Last
Evening--Hundreds Were Turned
Away From the Door.

The Largest and Most Enthusiastic Gathering of People in the
Political History of San Jose--Death Blow to
the Cause of Mackenzie.

Rousing Speeches by W. A. Beasley, T. Westaboy, F. H. Benson, George D.



San Jose Herald, May 17, 1902, Page Two

The reform of San Jose's political structure began in 1896 when it was an agricultural community of 21,000 people. The reform activities of some San Jose citizens in the last decade of the nineteenth century were repeated in other municipalities across the country. That activity represents a prelude to the period of American history known as the Progressive Era.

Beginning with a new city charter in 1897, the citizens of San Jose, led by members of the business and professional community, challenged the entrenched political "machine" represented by ward, city, and county "bossism." Their methods included innovative political reform, legal action, and yellow journalism tactics which explored new depths of character assassination and sensationalism.¹

The reformers attacked both the "machine" and its corrupt practices. In the newspapers that they purchased to advance their cause, they repeatedly asserted that San Jose had stagnated in a cesspool of corruption which repulsed any outside investment in the growth and development of the city.² At the same time they argued that the costs of operating and maintaining municipal services had risen to an outrageous degree. Municipal taxation, therefore, became a central issue. Waste and corruption slowed down or prevented the construction of new paved roads, electrical lines, street lighting, the extension of streetcar services and improved sewage systems. All of these additional and extended services created the necessity for efficiency in government and fiscal responsibility.

Within four years after its conception, an organization comprised of an elite group of business-oriented reformers had successfully marched the county "machine" to the wall and placed the overwhelming majority of its reform candidates in city office.

I. REPUBLICANISM AND THE "GANG"

The Republican Party had long dominated Santa Clara County politics and it in turn was dominated by the "Southern Pacific Political Bureau."³ According to George Mowry, the power of the Southern Pacific, "was evident in almost every party convention during the period and in practically every election."⁴

Political bossism in San Jose during this period was divided between the "Rea-Edwards gas house gang" and their successor,

John D. Mackenzie, who "formed the strongest political machine in the history of San Jose."⁵ James W. Rea was a successful attorney and wealthy businessman and the recognized "county boss for the Southern Pacific machine."⁶ Harry J. Edwards was manager of the Electric Improvement Company, a subsidiary of the San Francisco Power and Light Company. Mackenzie, a professional politician under the old regime was a natural successor to Rea. Their base of operation was the California Club and their voice was the *San Jose Evening News*.⁷

According to a 1908 article in the *San Jose Mercury*, reviewing the earlier history of San Jose, the "machine" sustained itself through "large contracts . . . let out to the favored patrons of the 'machine' . . . Gamblers and saloonkeepers were subjected to monthly 'graft' and school teachers were compelled at the risk of their positions to deal in 'machine' stores."⁸ Firemen, policemen and other politically appointed office holders were subject to kickbacks collected by the "heelers" of the "ring." The "ring" maintained its political power through threats of boycott, public slander and control of the election process.⁹

II. REPUBLICANISM AND THE REFORMERS

The main opposition to the entrenched Republican leadership at the turn of the century came from within the Republican party. The Good Government League, later renamed the Republican Good Government League, and the municipal parties that it supported were composed primarily of businessmen who formed a splinter group within the party and challenged the established local Republican leadership. There was "a strong feeling that a rough element has control of the Republican party and that a reform is much needed."¹⁰

The Good Government League ledgers reflect a league membership with a very strong upper-middle class business interest. The organization was composed of doctors, attorneys, judges, occasionally a professor, but mostly successful merchants, other businessmen, and orchardists.¹¹ The secret pledge of membership into the League was the oath of a business alliance morally outraged and monetarily handicapped by the tight control of the Republican machine on business in the Santa Clara Valley.

I desire to become a member of the Good Government League of Santa Clara Valley.

I am a Republican.

In the event of my election as a member of said League I pledge myself to advance by every honorable means to secure the nomination and election to office of pure, honest and fearless men; to do all in my power to overthrow and defeat political bosses and rings, their tools and creatures, especially the ring at present controlling the offices and patronage of Santa Clara County...

However, just as the leaders of the "gang" Republicans discovered that the combination of political control and business was not only compatible, but highly profitable, so did the "reform" Republicans cultivate their business ideology of politics for personal gain.

The most influential figures of the "reform" Republicans were the Hayes brothers, Everis Anson Hayes and Jay Orlo Hayes. The two men moved to San Jose in 1887 and ten years later emerged as the leaders of the Good Government League of Santa Clara County. Both E. A. Hayes and J. O. Hayes had similar backgrounds. Both had degrees from the University of Wisconsin, were practicing lawyers, and had substantial wealth accumulated from their iron mines in Michigan. Once in San Jose they purchased a ranch home and fruit enterprise and through their positions in the California Prune and Apricot Growers Association eventually moved into local politics. After the formation of the Good Government League, E. A. Hayes retained the office of presidency throughout the life of the organization, while J. O. Hayes remained on the Board of Trustees.

By 1901 the Hayes brothers had purchased the *Herald* and the *Mercury*. The combined influence of the League and the ownership of the two major newspapers in San Jose proved enormously effective in attaining political goals and success for the Hayes brothers, as well as for the League. As E. A. Hayes himself stated, they "were in the newspaper business to help carry out the objects of the League and they were going to do it to the best of their ability."

By 1905 (the same year that the Good Government League dissolved) E. A. Hayes had been elected to Congress where he served for fourteen years while J. O. Hayes ran the two newspapers until his death in 1948. J. O. remained active in California politics as a delegate to the state Republican convention. He was also an active member of the San Jose Chamber of Commerce, the Commercial Club, and various civic groups.

The political success of the Hayes brothers demonstrated the ideology of the Good Government League: To replace "gang" politicians with "responsible" citizens. In 1901 the League was frequently in touch with state Republican reform leaders in Sacramento and seriously considered organizing a League branch in every county of California. Although this did not become a reality, the Good Government League did maintain an active lobby in the state capital.

III. INSTRUMENTS OF REFORM

The origins of the progressive movement in San Jose reach back to the creation of a new city charter in 1896 by a board of 15 Freeholders. While the charter was approved by over 60% of those voting on November, 1897, this represented the opinion of only one-seventh of the population. But the charter became the vehicle for the reform movement, whose vanguard was the New Charter Club, an organization composed of the original 15 Freeholders. These men voted to remain an active body "to unite in one organization those who desire to secure good government in the city of San Jose by substituting correct business principles in the management of public affairs in the place of the present corrupt and wasteful system." The New Charter Club together with the newly formed Good Government League of Santa Clara County, vociferously challenged the corruptness of the city administration and its methods, and proposed to replace both bad men and bad methods with "good government, run more effectively like a business."

The major new innovations in the city charter included two basic changes in the municipal government: Legislative organization designed to end "one man rule" and a new system of funding the administration. All councilmen were elected by their individual wards under the old system. The new charter, however, provided for the four ward councilmen and a new "at large" position to be voted on by the entire body of the electorate. This feature lent itself to a "fuller expression of public opinion in the case of each candidate for council," thus allowing "for greater

community representation." The mayor was to be virtually stripped of his appointive powers. The new charter specified that an Appointing Board be elected at large for the purpose of appointing officers such as the Fire and Police Commission and the Board of Education. Each Board, after these initial appointments, would be renewed by appointments of the mayor, but in accordance with a system of staggered retirement so that no single administration could seriously affect its personality.

The Charter, "framed by taxpayers, provided for a careful guarding of the city treasury with a view to an administration of the public business at the lowest expense to the taxpayer." It contained a provision to allow for the removal of tax assessment and collection from the local to the county level and a "cash basis fund" to ensure that the payment for the running expenses of the city government be on a cash basis making each administration responsible for its own expenses. No burden of debt could be left to a later administration. The Charter also fixed the limit of taxation. It was not to exceed one dollar upon each one-hundred dollar evaluation of property assessed.

The limitation of mayoral powers indicated a strong distrust of the office, which is to say, a distrust of the former mayors themselves. In years to come the power of the mayor was weakened still more, leading to the almost total elimination of the authority of the office in the reform charter of 1916. The new tax assessment and collection feature in the 1897 charter served as the first indication of taxpayer skepticism over the previous method. Sanford E. Smith, president of the New Charter Club, expressed that distrust, for example, when he filed suit to force the hesitant council to pass an ordinance to "properly provide for the collection of taxes for the city by the county tax collector."

San Jose Mercury, April 27, 1902, Page One

YOUNG MEN RALLY AROUND STANDARD OF WORSWICK



IV. 1898: LESSONS WELL LEARNED

On April 11, 1898, the first election under the new charter was held. The issues were clear to the reformers: should San Jose remain under the power of the "gang of politicians" or implement the progressive ideals of the new Charter under "responsible" local leadership. This municipal election was the initial challenge to the "old guard" itself: victory would mean a continuation of the public mandate given in the passage of the new charter. The New Charter Club, backed by the Good Government League, openly accused the former administration of graft, theft, corruption and mismanagement in San Jose. The rhetoric that ensued reflected a clear cut struggle between municipal control by city boss or "gang" control versus efficient business-like municipal management.

Mayor Val Kock (ironically one of the 15 reforming Freeholders) and the majority of the incumbents did not run. Three tickets were offered to the citizens of San Jose: The People's Municipal Ticket, the New Charter Club and the Independent

In the meantime, the Good Government League instigated investigations and consequently court suits against the illegal polling procedures currently practiced in the county.²⁹ Heavily publicizing the corrupt gang polling tactics used in the municipal election of 1898, the Good Government League won its first substantial victory in the county election in November.³⁰ On a Democratic-Republican "fusion ticket" eight League supported candidates secured eight of the sixteen county offices including Supreme Court Judge, District Attorney and the office of tax collector. Such old line Republicans as Representative E. F. Loud and State Senator Charles M. Shorridge were returned to office in the overwhelming state Republican landslide. And "Boss" J. W. Rea was also reinstated as County Supervisor, however with such a slim margin that even the *Herald* (which supported him) commented upon his loss of popular support.³¹ The Good Government League had clearly succeeded in opening up the county to "good government." It would continue to focus on a county-state level,

VOLUME LXXII

SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA, TUESDAY AFTERNOON, MAY 20, 1902—EIGHT PAGES

NUMBER 120

CORRUPT BOSS RULE IN THE CITY OF SAN JOSE IS ENDED

San Jose Mercury, May 20, 1902, Page One

Party. The race was most clearly polarized between the People's Municipal Ticket and the New Charter Club. Charles J. Martin, a previous councilman and mayor led the People's Ticket which included J. N. Ewing, the City Treasurer since 1894, and J. W. Cook, Clerk from the previous administration. These three experienced politicians plus the party's endorsement by the *Evening News* and the *Mercury* indicated affiliation with the pre-charter administration and its ideals.

The New Charter Club ran its president, Sanford E. Smith, for mayor along with four businessmen and a teacher, all political neophytes. Only their candidate for Councilman at Large, J. P. Jarman, had previous political experience. He had been a councilman of the Fourth Ward and was, at this time, a member of the Good Government League.

Lacking the direct backing of a newspaper, the Good Government League published pamphlets in support of the New Charter Club candidates which elucidated the issues. "San Jose," one leaflet proclaimed, in an address to the taxpayer, "is the worst taxed town (per capita) of its size in the United States."²³ Extensive tables compared San Jose with numerous other communities of similar size across the United States. San Jose taxes were spent without reference to the public good or necessities and were designed rather to "feed the San Jose gang of politicians." The leaflet concluded, "we have simply been systematically robbed."²⁴ A scathing anonymous letter to the editor of the *Herald* made the accusation that political appointees returned as much as one-half of their salaries to their "official creators." This in effect answered the question: "How else can men afford to pay \$500 to \$1,000 to be elected to a position to which there is no salary and to which no lawful fees are attached."²⁵

Wielding their pamphlets against the three major San Jose newspapers, the Good Government League advised the citizens to vote the entire Charter Club ticket, "thus redeeming our fair city from boss and gang and striking such a blow at corrupt government as will encourage the friends of reform everywhere."²⁶

The People's Municipal Ticket was elected in 1898 despite the Good Government League's evaluation of its virtues and political connections. Having lost the municipal elections, the Good Government League directed its focus to the county elections, and concentrated on the primary causes of their failure to wrest the city from the clutch of the gang: The lack of press coverage and corrupt polling methods.

The League attacks apparently induced the new council to initiate several reform measures of its own. There was an attempt by the "gang" to reverse the newly established tax assessment and collection procedures in November, 1898. Reporting that "some members of the council are the gang's most obedient servants," the *Herald*, a Democratic anti-"gang," anti-Republican newspaper at this time, expressed the fear that the council would attempt to return tax assessment to local control. But with the support of the new mayor and two members of the council, this attempt was unsuccessful.²⁷ The council also fired several notorious political appointees of the previous administration and reduced the salaries of three high school teachers, whose appointments were of an apparent political nature, from \$140 to \$75 a month as an inducement to quit.²⁸

abstaining from the support of a municipal ticket in 1900.

The city of San Jose was served by three major newspapers. The *Evening News* had long been an established Republican newspaper supporting the "gang" ticket in earlier county and local elections and espousing strong anti-Hayes and anti-"Goo Goo" sentiment throughout the early 1900s. Until 1899, the *Herald* was the only Democratic daily newspaper published between San Francisco and Los Angeles. It was purchased in September, 1899, by Republican State Senator Shorridge and not surprisingly began supporting "gang" Republicanism until it drifted into creditor receivership in August, 1900. On January 9, 1901 it was officially announced that the *Herald* had passed into the hands of new owners, the Hayes brothers.³² Although J. O. Hayes, the President and General Manager of the Herald Publishing Company initially denied that the paper would become a mouthpiece for the Good Government League, the official policy statement in the paper contained some familiar Good Government League rhetoric:

More than anything else its theme will be to assist in all legitimate ways to building up the city of San Jose and Santa Clara County and it will be interested in and will support every effort to promote their prosperity.³³

The other major San Jose newspaper and the only morning daily, the *Mercury*, maintained a neutral, if slightly Republican position, until it too was purchased by the Hayes brothers in 1901. On November 1, 1903, the two publications were combined as the *San Jose Mercury-Herald*. Once in possession of these newspapers, the Good Government League was ready to launch an all out attack against the city machine of San Jose. From the date of their purchase by the Hayes brothers, both newspapers pursued a one-sided campaign with pointed omissions of references to other than Good Government League supported candidates or issues.

V. 1902: VICTORY

In a presidential speech given in December, 1898, E. A. Hayes discussed the objectives and accomplishments of the Good Government League. In less than a year the League had risen from an initial membership of 39 to over 200 middle to upper class businessmen, all carefully screened for their integrity prior to acceptance. Reviewing their first year in operation, Hayes pointed out that the League had eliminated corrupt polling procedures, petitioned Sacramento to change the status of city and county offices, enlightened the voter to the "gang" connection of current Republican leaders, and won considerable offices in the county elections.

Hayes then drew the future plans: To carry through the prosecutions of the election fraud trials, focus attention on the city and county officials and the expenditure of public funds, and support a primary election law.

In the November 6, 1900, county elections, the Good Government League supported an impressive number of victorious candidates; League members being elected to the 54th and 56th Assembly districts.

Although leeway had been made in San Jose, the League did not support a municipal ticket until 1902. With the *Herald* and *Mercury* under reform ownership, the Independence Club candidate for mayor, George D. Worswick, was swept to victory on the

loudly re-emphasized anti-gang rhetoric of 1898. Worswick and the entire ticket supported by the Good Government League, with the exception of City Treasurer, replaced the gang-tool regime; clearly a San Jose "progressive" victory.

Worswick was subsequently re-elected in 1904 and the League was further victorious in county elections, and finally elected E. A. Hayes to the United States Congress in 1905.

VI. EVALUATION

Although the changes in the 1897 charter were immediately effective at weakening the power and influence of the established Republican political structure, many of the reforms themselves were in fact restrictive. As an example, the initial "councilman at large" position created in the 1897 charter was the first step at eliminating the more democratic ward system—sacrificing ward autonomy for municipal unity. Restricting the appointive powers of the mayor was the first step toward the elimination of the authority of that position and the eventual consolidation of city government in the hands of a city manager.

However, the new charter was a popular reform in that it did reduce the level of corruption in San Jose. Furthermore it was popular by virtue of its instigation and backing by the taxpayers of the city. That the new charter would benefit the taxpaying citizen and businessman was ensured by the tax limit on property and the cash fund measure.

The Good Government League was an innovative political instrument of the reform movement. It was the first political group in Santa Clara County to rise in stature and influence enough to successfully challenge the Republican Southern Pacific authority on city, county and state levels for eight years. The League sup-

ported and won elections with tickets composed of local citizens unmarred by previous political experience. As a result of pressure from the League, former mayor-appointed offices were changed to county jurisdiction and county primaries were enacted.

The extent of the influence of the Southern Pacific on San Jose politics at the turn of the century has not been sufficiently documented. It is strongly suspected that it provided the primary source of power behind the Republican "machine" which dominated San Jose politics. As an agricultural community dependent on the railroads for transportation of its produce to aid market, the implications are obvious.

A city management subservient to a state political system and occupied with thoughts of personal gain does not keep adequate pace with the rapid development of the Bay Area. Frustrated by this lack of attention to urban growth and expansion necessary for the development of the business community, those most directly affected sought to replace the prevailing political system with one of their own. Thus the primary goal was to open the city up to the growth and commerce that the Santa Clara Valley had to offer. Although no statistical evidence exists to determine how the economy of San Jose was affected by the entrance of the early progressives into office, the political success of the businessmen in the form of the Good Government League is indicated in a concluding remark made by a committee to study the reorganization of the League in 1903:

The present city administration and county Republican organization are now in the hands of our members and friends.³⁴

San Jose Herald, May 20, 1902, Page Two





San Jose Herald, May 9, 1902, Page One

The Worswick Reformers and "The Push," 1902-1904

Richard C. Wakefield

A prosperous community in the Progressive Era was one that attracted both people and capital. According to the new business-led reform movement, San Jose was accomplishing neither one of those objectives. During the 1902 and 1904 city election campaigns the reformer-owned *Mercury* asked some leading citizens for the reasons why. People would neither settle nor invest their money in San Jose, responded F. C. Ensign, a former real estate dealer, because they were afraid "to take their chances in a place where government was notoriously bad. Every taxpayer fears bad local government. Capital is timid."¹ A physician from Springfield, Massachusetts who was worth \$150,000 was interested in coming to San Jose. But the *Mercury* reported that after inquiring of a friend about property taxes and the type of government in San Jose, he decided against moving there.² These examples dramatize what reformers saw as an important consequence of machine control in San Jose.

On April 2, 1902, a mass convention of citizens met in Turn Verein Hall, to nominate a municipal opposition ticket against the "boss rule" candidates of the city. S. G. Tompkins, selected as Secretary for the Citizens' Committee, voiced the feelings of the entire group when he asked:

Must we govern under a system of the boss, for the boss, and by the boss, must we be competing as to who is the lowest dog, so to speak, or is this convention to develop its own antidote for such disease.³

At this convention, George D. Worswick was selected the candidate for mayor to head the Citizens' Municipal Ticket for honest government. He was to receive vigorous support from the two reform newspapers, the *San Jose Mercury* and the *San Jose Herald*. The convention began a bitter fight which ended in the election of Worswick and in a victory for the Good Government League forces.

"The push," the name given to the "boss" and his followers by the *Mercury*, was headed by John D. Mackenzie. Adolph Greeninger was Mackenzie's candidate for mayor. They would pull out every stop in political corruption to try and get their candidate

elect. The Worswick people were no more charitable about Mackenzie and his band of "heelers, vagrants, and bums."

"THE PUSH"

John D. Mackenzie and his brother, Andrew, owned the San Jose Foundry. Adolph Greeninger, who had been a resident of San Jose since 1865, was the owner of the Globe Carriage Factory, which he helped establish along with his brother. He had been a member of the county board of supervisors and as early as 1873, he had been elected a city councilman. His popularity, however, had waned in the years before the 1902 election. In 1896 he ran for assessor and was defeated by five hundred votes.

In an apparent effort to confuse the voters about which candidate was on which slate, Mackenzie and his followers returned to the "Peoples' Municipal Ticket" label that they had used in 1898. But in contrast to the plebian party name, "the push" had dainty cards printed up and distributed to the voters much in the manner that (in the words of the pro-reform *Mercury*) "a caller at a Fifth avenue mansion" might.⁴

In order to ensure that the city's election officers would be friends of "the push," Mackenzie and his mayor placed 58 people in these positions. Many of the new officers were ineligible because they did not reside in the precinct where they were to be election officers. Evans Dent, for example, a lieutenant in the Mackenzie machine, was appointed ballot clerk in the Fifth precinct. But Dent resided in the Fourth precinct. Of the remaining 62 names on the list of election officers, many were ineligible because they held another public office.⁵ The "push" candidate for councilman from the Fourth Ward was not even a resident of San Jose. W. H. Anderson did rent an apartment at 141 S. First Street, but he lived at No. 2 White Street, which was not in the city limits. The city directory also listed his residence at the White Street address.⁶

To give "the push" much needed support and possibly to help keep San Jose in the hands of politicians friendly to Governor Henry T. Gage, four hundred election workers were imported from San Francisco. Gage was the governor of California from 1898-1902 and was controlled by the Southern Pacific forces. The San

EVIDENCE THAT FIREMEN OF SAN JOSE WERE BLACKMAILED

Efforts of the Mackenzie Push to Stifle an Investigation of Serious Charges Will Come to Naught--The Facts Will Be Given to the Voters of San Jose in Sworn Affidavits--The Opening Installment Furnished by William Tennant, Whose Statement Furnishes Clear Proof of the Allegations Made in Miller's Petition for an Investigation.

San Jose Herald, May 10, 1902, Page One

Francisco helpers were, according to the *San Francisco Call*, under the direction of Jesse Marks, ex-boss of the Fortieth Assembly district.⁷ They were to do anything to help the Mackenzie machine stay in office.

Finally, "the push," in a desperate attempt to defeat Worswick, charged him with corruption. In a speech at Schuetzen Park, mayoral candidate Greeninger produced checks purported to have been signed by Worswick and paid to members of the Grand Army of the Republic to buy their votes. In a sworn statement, Worswick said that he did not have an account at the James A. Costa Bank, where the checks had been drawn. He also stated that he had not and would not buy anyone's vote.⁸

WORSWICK AND GOOD GOVERNMENT

George D. Worswick proved to be a strong candidate for mayor. He had a reputation for honesty and he was an eloquent speaker. Worswick spent most of his early years in Ketchum, Idaho, where he owned a mercantile business. As a result of his business success, Worswick was later made a district manager for the Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Company. The Idaho climate did not agree with a member of Worswick's family so he moved to San Jose in 1890 and went into the fruit business. By 1895, Worswick was the manager of the California Green and Dried Fruit Company. In 1901, he resigned that position and took over a similar one with the Pine Box Manufacturers Agency. He also was president of the San Jose Council of the National Union, a fraternal insurance order.⁹ Worswick had a broad base of support that included much of the San Jose labor and business community, and, not least, the support of the two Hayes papers, the *Mercury* and the *Herald*. Both papers carried endorsements of various citizens for Worswick. Such enticing slogans as "Worswick is strong because he is manly,"¹⁰ appeared. These papers also exposed all the corruption that they found about the Mackenzie machine.

Worswick received some crucial support from labor. A. B. Campbell, the chairman of the reformers' Citizens' Committee, was an officer of the Carpenters' Union.¹¹ John J. Craig, president of the San Jose Typographical Union, endorsed Worswick.¹² An especially unusual action came when the employees of the Southern Pacific Railroad organized the Railroad Political Club, to work in Worswick's behalf. This committee was organized on the same day that E. H. Harriman, president of the Southern Pacific paid a visit to San Jose.¹³ The pro-labor mayor of San Francisco, John Schmitz, spoke to the Stableman's Union on behalf of Worswick. He expressed his concern for the people of San Jose and appealed to them to have a labor representative on the citizens' ticket.¹⁴ The San Francisco mayor's support was clearly helpful.

San Jose Herald, May 15, 1902, Page One

After John Mackenzie's defeat Jesse Marks commented: "Whenever a town is big enough to have labor unions, Mayor Schmitz has the influence. Schmitz is the cause of Johnny's defeat."¹⁵

James W. "Jim" Rea, former boss in San Jose in the late 1890s, became a supporter of Worswick in the 1902 election. In March, the Santa Clara County Republican League met to elect representatives to the state convention. In an effort to take over complete control of the County League, Mackenzie pushed for the ouster of the league president so that his own man, Louis Oneal, would be elected in his place. Rea stood up to oppose Mackenzie's move but the "vagrants, heelers, and bums," that Mackenzie packed into the meeting finally shouted him down. Mackenzie took control of the League.¹⁶ It was at that point that Rea became a supporter of Worswick and good government. With Rea's help, a portion of "the push" vote was secured for the reform platform.¹⁷ After the election, Rea was called upon to make a speech to the Independence Club at a victory party. He talked about "losing his reputation" as a "boss" and went on to say:

I believe in the innate goodness of the people, although sometimes they get under bad leadership. We must clean out the idea that there is anything in politics. It must be an unselfish and patriotic spirit that imbues the voters.¹⁸

It appears that the Good Government League came to terms with Southern Pacific during the Worswick election. Nowhere during the period leading up to the election was there any criticism of Southern Pacific activities by the *Mercury* or the *Herald*, either on the local or on the state scene. Yet throughout the state, the various reform newspapers were vigorously attacking the Southern Pacific machine. In none of Worswick's speeches was anything said about Southern Pacific, good or bad. The fact that after a visit to San Jose by S. P. President Harriman the local employees of Southern Pacific formed an organization in support of Worswick would also point to some type of an agreement. Finally, James W. Rea had been the county boss for the Southern Pacific machine. His break with Mackenzie and subsequent alliance with the reformers is further evidence of an agreement between Southern Pacific and the Good Government League forces. This would appear to indicate that the reformers were not above making deals with the "bosses" to gain power.

THE COSTS OF CORRUPTION

As was indicated earlier, it was evident that the businessmen behind Worswick were mainly concerned with the lack of economic growth under the Mackenzie regime. In an editorial in the *Mercury*, one businessman felt that a Worswick victory would

THE MEN WHO EXPOSED THE "RING" BLACKMAILERS



CITY TREASURY PLUNDERED TO PAY DEBTS OF CALIFORNIA CLUB

San Jose Mercury, May 9, 1902, Page One

mean five million dollars in new revenue for San Jose. High taxes, lack of protection and fear of blackmail were all part of a corrupt government according to the businessman. This gentleman felt that corrupt politics kept people, industries and capital out of the San Jose area.¹⁹

During the campaign, the *Mercury* and the leaders of the Citizens' Committee cited many examples of corruption under the existing Martin administration which pointed again toward the Mackenzie machine. During "the push" control, the streets deteriorated to a condition worse than that of ten or twelve years earlier. "The push" remedied this problem by replacing the street superintendent with not one person, but eight. So instead of paying one man \$1200 a year to keep up the streets, they paid eight men a total of \$7000 a year.²⁰

C. P. Hall, lessee and manager of the Victory Theater, was blackmailed into giving free tickets to the members of "the push." He and his employees were subjected to petty and unwarranted annoyances and various interferences of business by the police. When Hall asked what he could do to correct this situation, he was told by Police and Fire Commissioner W. J. Osterman that complimentary passes to the shows would alleviate the problem. When the passes to the shows were issued, the annoyances stopped. Besides Osterman, John and his brother Andrew Mackenzie also received tickets. A total of 36 free passes were issued at each show to members of "the push."²¹

The worst example of corruption exposed by the *Mercury* had to do with the taking of money from firemen to help pay for the political campaigns of the Mackenzie candidates. Two firemen, William F. Tennant and George Hines, gave sworn testimony to the *Mercury* as to the manner by which this money was obtained. During the city and county elections of 1898 and 1900, the chiefs of the various fire crews demanded a \$35 assessment from each fireman. The assessment was paid to the California Club, a political group headed by Mackenzie. Those who failed to pay the assessment were dropped from the department. During these two elections, fireman Tennant paid four assessments ranging from \$20 to \$105 for a total of \$180 paid to the California Club. This sum represented nearly two months salary for him.²²

WORSWICK'S ADMINISTRATION

On May 19, 1902, Worswick was elected mayor of San Jose. Every member of the Citizens' Municipal Ticket was elected but one. Only T. J. McGeoghegan, the incumbent City Treasurer, was returned to office. Worswick's first two years in office were productive ones. There were major improvements in street repairs, street lighting, a great increase in new construction and major charter change.

On February 18, 1903, the citizens of San Jose supported one amendment to the city charter. It allowed any money that still remained in the general fund or any specific fund at the end of the fiscal year to be shifted to any other specific fund that would best serve the public interest as determined by the mayor and the

San Jose Mercury, May 13, 1902, Page One

Common Council. This would allow the city to meet any emergency which might arise and that could not be met by the funds already appropriated in that area. This amendment was also intended as a check against a dishonest increase of surplus money and it would not allow the money to be spent on "wild schemes" or improper purposes. The amendment was passed by a 60 percent majority of the vote.²³

During Worswick's first two years in office, real estate prices increased as much as 50 percent. Reformers credited Worswick's administration for the fact that San Jose's population had increased from 21,400 in 1900 to 27,868 by 1904. This represented a gain of 30 percent—according to the reformer's statistics, at least.²⁴ During the period from January 1, 1903 to March 31, 1904, the Worswick administration secured \$563,399 in revenue from new building permits for the city treasury. It was estimated that between 500 and 700 new buildings were erected during Worswick's first two years in office. These buildings totalled a million and a half dollars worth of construction.²⁵

Worswick's administration also accomplished much in the area of street repairs. One hundred and fifty new street crossings had been put in by 1904. Forty streets had been repaired and Delmas Avenue was put under a new covering of gravel. The city also purchased a new grader to "crown up" the streets.²⁶ Under Worswick, East Santa Clara Street, a real headache for the Mackenzie regime, was repaired at a cost of \$7,807.07. The money to pay for these street repairs came from "money saved by economy in other branches of the city government." Mackenzie's people had estimated the cost for repair of East Santa Clara Street to be \$17,385.77. It was to be paid by a bond issue, but the bonds were never voted.²⁷ Street lighting was almost doubled under the Worswick administration. But the yearly cost was still nearly \$400 less than that paid by the Mackenzie machine.²⁸

These first two years that Worswick was in power were uncommonly free of corruption, although one scandal was uncovered by the old machine during the 1904 election campaign. But ironically the event involved a former "push" politician. T. J. McGeoghegan, the last hold over of the Mackenzie regime, was found to have a deficit of \$9,823.07 in the city treasury. "The push" tried to use this as a spring board back into power. The officials representing the bonding companies for the city were used by Mackenzie in an effort to involve Worswick in the scandal. Mr. Lloyd of the American Bonding Company refused to pay the whole deficit and asked that the mayor make up part of the deficit by using money from the campaign committee. Worswick saw through this "attempted blackmail" and immediately filed suit against the bonding companies for repayment of the stolen funds. This killed Mackenzie's attempt to regain control, although the machine returned to power in 1906.²⁹

In 1904, the *Mercury* interviewed former San Jose businessman C. M. Wooster (then in business in San Francisco) about what another Worswick victory would mean to the city. Wooster claimed

BLACKMAIL AND BRIBERY PILE UP AGAINST JOHN D. MACKENZIE

Miller's Attorneys Furnish Evidence Showing How Gamblers Were Guaranteed Protection in Their Business on Payment of Tribute.



San Jose Herald, May 15, 1902, Page One

that "as a commercial proposition for San Jose as a corporation, the re-election of Mayor Worswick will be worth \$500,000 to the city."³⁰ As long as there was honest government Wooster felt San Jose would continue to be a prosperous corporation. The voters seemed to agree. Compared to 1902, the 1904 election was a low key affair. Worswick and his entire slate were re-elected.

CONCLUSION

In terms of the goals set down by the Good Government League, Worswick and his administration proved measurably successful. They succeeded in at least decreasing corruption in politics and brought new economic growth to San Jose. Worswick eliminated many of the useless offices created by "the push" and saved the city money in the various areas of the city treasury. In his first year in office the treasury showed a balance of \$6,711.45 in the school fund alone.³¹ A number of municipal services were greatly improved. Worswick did much to please the reformers, but no reforms were made in election mechanics and only one in the city government structure itself during Worswick's first two years in office. Although there was no reduction in the tax rate, there was a tax refund to the people of San Jose in 1904. As a result of the Worswick administration's efforts an important amendment to the city charter was passed in February, 1903 that allowed a tighter control over city finances.

One attempted reform of the Worswick administration failed. One of the amendments to the charter voted on by the citizens of San Jose on February 13, 1903, required that no teacher could be

San Jose Herald, May 14, 1902, Page One

removed from his or her job for political reasons alone. To fire a teacher under the proposed amendment, the Board of Trustees had to show cause; charges had to be filed and the teacher given a trial in an open court. This amendment would have removed politics from the schools and would no longer force a teacher to "button hole" his friends to vote for the designated candidate in order to keep his position. The amendment was suggested by the teachers and strongly backed by the mayor and Common Council along with the *Mercury*. But it was defeated by one percent of the total vote cast. Many of the people who voted for the finance amendment did not vote for this one. Other voters felt that a teacher's position should depend on the character of the Board of Education and not a change in the wording of the charter. It was the opinion of the *Mercury* that the amendment lost because some teachers opposed it and openly campaigned against the amendment.³² These teachers felt that the amendment would not have improved their position and that it was not "advisable for the positions of any intellectuals to be made permanent."³³

But the original image of the reform administration suffered from more than this relatively minor setback at the polls. It appears that the Good Government League people were not afraid to make deals with the "bosses" to further their own position. Through the 1904 elections the *Mercury* still refrained from making an attack on the Southern Pacific machine. Thus, while it seems clear that Worswick did much to encourage economic growth in San Jose, he did not permanently alter either the structure—or, in some respects, at least, the morality of city politics.

INSULTING ATTEMPT TO BRIBE A WORKINGMAN TO VOTE PUSH TICKET

San Jose Herald, May 17, 1902, Page One

BEWARE OF CAMPAIGN TRICKS AND LIES

The Frantic Efforts of the Push to Save the City Council--Offer to Trade Greeninger--Pay No Attention to Such Offers--Vote the Whole Ticket, Vote Early and Then Take Off Your Coat and Work.

Centralization and Efficiency: The Reformers Shape Modern San Jose Government, 1910-1916

by Valerie Ellsworth and Andrew J. Garbely

On July 1, 1916, San Jose adopted a new charter that radically altered the political machinery of city government. Since the late nineties, the progressive reformers had attempted to rid San Jose of "boss rule." Their efforts resulted in the passing of a charter which placed local governmental control primarily into the hands of men who directed policy from a purely business orientation. Although earlier officials were also businessmen for the most part, city government, prior to the change, was influenced by more than this one segment of society.

Before the change in 1916, four of the five city councilmen, although elected by the city at large, had to reside in their respective wards. The major change, however, was the elimination of the mayor by an "expert" in municipal affairs. This official was the city manager who directed most of the affairs of the city and who was not elected by the populace. Only the city councilmen had the power to appoint and dismiss him. What had taken place in San Jose, as in numerous other cities in the United States during the Progressive Era, was a centralization of power in local government that would increase efficiency and eliminate what the reformers referred to as "minority" or "self-interest" rule. These reformers struggled throughout the era to gain local control of government to implement their plan to organize city government along the same lines as a corporation. By managing the city like a corporation, the reformers felt that local government could operate more efficiently and remain free from "political" interference, to best serve the interests of the community as a whole.

Members of the reform movement in San Jose were, for the most part, businessmen who focused much of their energy during this period toward reshaping the community to meet their own specific needs, which in turn, they felt would help the city as a whole.

These reformers, despite their claim to have the total community interest in mind, sought to reform city government to meet their own specific goals and needs which excluded much of the population from representation or voice in governmental affairs. They were willing to sacrifice popular representation in order to gain efficiency. The story behind their efforts and ultimate success will be examined in this study which begins in 1910 and ends with the adoption of the new charter in 1916.

Before reviewing how they gained control, it is more important, first, to obtain a clear picture of who these reformers were and what they specifically hoped to achieve by implementing the City Manager plan for city government.

THE REFORMERS

The efforts of the Good Government League to end municipal corruption and to bring about reform in San Jose were considered accomplished when its candidates were elected to office in 1902 and 1904. But defeat in 1906 caused the Good Government League reformers to wonder how secure their control really was. They came to see the 1897 charter as the source of their failure permanently to control the city council seats.

In 1906, the reformers lost all council seats and the office of mayor to the revived machine. After a few years of "bossism" the reformers came to the conclusion that a new city charter had to be drawn up if effective control of the city government was to be achieved.

After J. O. Hayes, a founding official of the Good Government League, combined the *Mercury* and the *Herald* newspapers in 1903,

enthusiastic support was given to all reform candidates. This support continued throughout the 1910, 1912 and 1914 elections. Besides giving recognition to reform candidates, this newspaper became an important element in the campaign to obtain a new charter.

By the time of the 1910 election, the reformers had organized for the purpose of revamping the charter. Most of these people were businessmen and members of the upper class in San Jose. The Chamber of Commerce helped to initiate the movement while the Women's Civic Study League worked for the adoption of the proposed changes. The Good Government League had drawn largely from the business community for its membership just as these later reformers would do. But unlike the later reformers the early reform movement had not made many concessions to other groups in a search for broad community support.

The reformers in San Jose claimed that the immediate stimulus for their reform efforts was the corruption in municipal government. Specifically, they accused two mayors—Davison and Monahan—of bribery in allowing such illegal practices as lotteries and slotmachines to exist.¹ The reformers insisted that these and other vices made San Jose unattractive for future growth. But the most vehement charge against the "bosses" was that they represented a minority. They represented only corrupt politicians and a small and selfish electorate.

But the reformers themselves interpreted the needs of the community of San Jose in terms of the minority needs of the business class. One particular concern was to expand and improve the city streets. The business reformers also wished to control the operation of other public facilities such as lighting, plumbing, paving, and fire inspection in order to maintain favorable conditions for business. In 1918, an article in the *American City*, written by the secretary to San Jose's city manager, boasted of streets that were "cleaned, watered and otherwise cared for more satisfactorily than at any previous time." The street lights were changed which saved "\$1,584 a year." But most important, the secretary felt, was that a "constant inspection of business property has been achieved; and "regular meetings for the study of properties subject to fire risk [have] been established, with the result that the city has the lowest loss ratio, \$1.08 per inhabitant, in its history." There was also "a five year paving program" and "in all this work, centralized purchasing has been used to great advantage."²

The fire inspection of business and a special study on fire prevention lessened the risk of costly business fires. All of these improvements, the secretary responded, would lend themselves to improving the business climate in San Jose. These accomplishments were held up by the reformers as their chief contribution to the city.

A steady increase in the physical growth of San Jose was seen by the reformers as vital to the community. Various improvement groups around the San Jose area supported the drive for growth. The Gardner, Berryessa, and 6th Ward Improvement Clubs included the need for continued physical growth as one of their goals. The *Mercury-Herald* contrasted the mayoralities of Worswick, a reformer, with Davison through the actual growth of San Jose. Worswick was held up as an advocate of prosperity and growth while Davison was charged with stifling growth as was evidenced by the "700 vacant houses" in San Jose.³

Businessmen hoped for a new increase in San Jose's population.

An expected 20,000,000 people, the *Mercury-Herald* explained, would be drawn to the Pacific States due to the opening of the Panama Canal.⁴ This projected growth, the reformers felt, would be handled to its greatest advantage under the management of reform candidates operating under a new city charter.

Many of the reformers sought public office in order to carry out their proposals. The most important reform plan called for a new charter with major changes in the municipal government. In 1915, this reform charter passed and took effect in 1916 when four reform councilmen were elected. One of them—Elmer E. Chase—was “a man of marked executive ability which enabled him to achieve a high degree of success.”⁵ He was a past President of the Board of Education, Vice-President of the Bank of San Jose (1919), co-owner of Richmond-Chase Company (dealers in fruit and canned fruit) and quite active in reform organizations, such as the Commission Government League, the Committee of Fifty, and he was a freholder in 1915. He was elected councilman in 1916 which allowed him to implement the municipal reforms he had helped to design. W. L. Atkinson and Charles O'Brien were reformers of similar backgrounds who were members of the Commission Government League, the Committee of Fifty, and freeholders of 1915. They were also elected to office with Chase.

Reform organizations in San Jose were mainly formed to espouse specific new plans such as the commission form of government and amendments to the 1897 charter. Therefore, membership was not based on wide representation from all classes in San Jose but was based upon acceptance of the organization's reform ideology. One group not involved in the reform movement was labor. Walter Matthewson, a labor leader and former councilman of San Jose, voiced opposition to reform proposals. He believed that the reformers' plan for a City Manager should allow for a popular recall of that manager.⁶ He also insisted upon trade union candidates in the election of freeholders. Traditionally the freeholders were property owners who were placed in charge of authoring a new charter. Moreover, the reformers required that all candidates wishing to run for freeholder on the reform ticket must pledge themselves beforehand to support a specific kind of charter. Matthewson and other labor candidates refused to accept such a proposal and ran as independents not affiliated with the reform ticket.

An editorial in the *Mercury-Herald* opposed the labor claims to representation. The people would not be given “a square deal where the interests of the labor unions were involved.”⁷ Labor should have some representation, the editor went on to say, “but it is not sufficiently representative of the 30,000 people who live in this community.”⁸

The reformers viewed themselves as impartial; as not representing class interests. They assumed therefore that their city charter could be representative of the entire community. They did not admit to any special interests although their ideology did reflect a business orientation. Their concern over the rapid growth of San Jose, the expansion of public facilities such as streets, lighting, and the centralization of power in a few officeholders can be seen as a direct attempt to establish their interests as primary for the entire community of San Jose. These business oriented reformers initiated their campaign for a change in government by way of the Chamber of Commerce, carried out their plan through their organizations with selective membership, and finally could see their plan implemented as their own new city councilmen took office in 1916. Yet, they accused labor of representing special interests. As a result, they viewed labor's interests as inappropriate within the new government.

EARLY REFORM EFFORTS

The four years from 1910 to 1914 can be seen as an effort by the reformers to discover a form of municipal government that would encompass their ideology. They were not particularly beholden to any one of the various plans available, but, in general, they favored a move that would centralize city government. If power was centralized, they felt, a better chance existed to gain office through a strong city wide campaign. Progressive movements in other cities at this time were experimenting with such centralized government. The reformers in San Jose sought to acquaint themselves with the features of different forms in order to use them for their new charter reform.

The most popular plan during this period was the Commission form which was first adopted in Galveston, Texas, around the turn of the century. Political scientist, Carl A. McCandless in a recent book has observed that “the most significant feature of the Commission form is its complete break with the idea of separation of legislature and executive power.” He explains that “a group of

SAN JOSE CHARTER IS TO BE AMENDED

Meeting Held Yesterday to Select 15 Freeholders From 30 Presented.

Chairman Speaks of the Need of an Up-to-Date Charter for the City..

Unofficial List of 15 Names Is Circulated in the Room, But Ruled Out.

San Jose Mercury, March 21, 1912, Page One

commissioners (usually from three to seven)” assumed the tasks thought of as those of a city councilman, but “each commissioner, as an individual officeholder is head of one of the city's administrative departments.”⁹

The commission form of government tends to centralize power into the hands of a few commissioners. Control of these commissioners by the reformers, in turn, would be a great advantage in obtaining ordinances favoring their ideology. Old party organizations would be de-emphasized because the election of the Commissioners was at large. The relationship of a ward party leader to a popularly elected ward councilman would be abolished, making a city-wide campaign more important in capturing an office than acquiring patronage at the lower levels. In a ward system, direct accountability by a ward councilman to his particular ward gave citizens a simple course of action for dissatisfaction. In comparison, a commission elected at large, might not feel so responsible to some local interests.

The *Mercury-Herald* felt the Commission form was deserving of enough notice to hire Sarah M. Severance to write a series of articles explaining the benefits of that plan. Severance described the situation in Galveston that had forced some citizens to write a new plan for the city. She mentioned that “a tidal wave overran the island of Galveston and left apparent ruin in its wake. The city had been badly governed, was under saloon rule and graft had done its work.” The cause of the problem could be found in “the large population in that seaport town of low-class foreigners and riff-raff negroes.”¹⁰

Early in 1910, the San Jose Chamber of Commerce discussed the possibility of the Commission form for San Jose. As a result of the interest created, the Commission Government League was formed. This organization met to study the feasibility of adopting such a program. After a number of meetings the League proposed to Common Council that 15 freeholders be selected in a special election for the purpose of framing a new city charter. The Common Council declared that the expense of the election prohibited

it. As a result, the reformers felt that Common Council was opposed to their reform movement and had used the election expense as an excuse. Reacting to this belief, the Commission Government League selected fifty of its members, called the Committee of Fifty, to write amendments to the existing charter. In this way, an election would be required by law when a petition signed by 15 percent of the voters called for the adoption of amendments.

These proposed amendments to the 1897 charter placed the initiative, referendum, recall, and the preferential primary in the legal system of San Jose. But these amendments were only a first step. The Committee of Fifty chairman, Frank Paterson, stated that the older charter would be converted into a commission government charter. He suggested that "nine-tenths of the charter" had been replaced "by the amendments and the remaining tenth considerably modified."¹¹ His understanding of the Commission form was certainly inadequate for he omitted the most vital part, the centralization of authority into a few Commissioners. But the misunderstanding about the amendments' effect seems to signal the general confusion that the reformers experienced during this period.

Most of these efforts at reform were advanced through separate organizations that had not yet attempted to unify into a single reform group. One of these reform groups was the Women's Civic Study League, organized for the purpose of reviewing the various forms of municipal government. The women included as their goal the formation of a new city charter. The secretary of the organization, Zona Williams, stated that "a recent canvass of the business center by a committee from the Civic Study League found the leading merchants strongly in favor of a progressive, up-to-date charter for our city."¹² The organization considered a poll of the business community to be sufficiently representative of the entire community's interests.

The Civic Study League was so strongly in favor of a new charter that it, at first, became hostile toward the proposed amendments. The women members felt that the amendments would only divert attention away from the actual need for a completely new charter. They did not want to amend the old one, they wanted an entirely new document. However, they softened their stand since they did end up supporting the amendments that were endorsed by the newspaper and the leading merchants they had canvassed.

Working for a completely new city charter was the goal of still another group—the Citizen's Charter Committee—with Mrs. A. A. Fowler acting as the chairwoman. Her rationale was one frequently expressed in Progressive Era municipal reform circles: "when a business is sick, an efficiency expert is sent for. The corporation of San Jose is mighty sick and the logical thing to do is to get a city government doctor."¹³ The reformers advocated the use of outside "experts" schooled in the art of municipal management who would guide the city in the direction of efficiency as opposed to "special interest" representation.

The search for an appropriate method of reform that would allow the reformers to gain control of the city offices was conducted by several organizations in this early period. Some of the changes they proposed were based on a poor interpretation of the Commission system. There had not been enough research done by the reformers as a group to give adequate shape to a distinct reform charter. Consequently, each organization felt that it was best qualified to lead the movement for municipal change. Even the *Mercury-Herald* opposed the reform amendments in 1912 when an editorial stated that "the charter has its imperfections, it is true, but these have been greatly overstated. The charter is sufficient."¹⁴ Eventually this newspaper was to give full support to the amendments just before their passage in 1914.

Whatever the reasons given by some organizations for their initial opposition to the charter amendments, it remained a fact that by the time they came to a vote, all the reformers supported them. As the reformers had been dispersed into separate organizations, each with separate goals, they had been unable to elect a mayor or councilmen in the elections of 1910 and 1912. Two years later they unified and won the election of 1914—and soon achieved their long desired goal of a new charter.

THE MUNICIPAL ELECTION OF 1914

During the 1914 election the reformers revised their tactics somewhat in order to achieve success at the polls. At least one tactic, however, remained the same. The harsh language that had been characteristic of reform rhetoric in previous campaigns emerged once again. The *Mercury-Herald* encouraged comments against the opposition ticket which was composed of many incumbents from the existing administration. In a front page article

Men and Women of San Jose

Be Fair to Yourselves

If You Really Are Against Bossism,
If You Really Are Against Machine Control,
If You Really Are Against Petty Politics,
If You Want to Hear the Real Truth,

Come to the

BIG RALLY AT THE GARDEN THEATRE — TONIGHT

Prof. Thos. A. Reed, of the University of California, the author of our new charter, will make plain its advantages and also its disadvantages should the wrong men be elected to office.

The Normal Campaign Quartet will render several campaign selections during the evening, among which will be the new song, "Good-bye, Gang."

Hear the Four Candidates Chase, O'Brien, Shaw and Atkinson

San Jose Mercury, April 29, 1916, Page Two

signed by a "property owner," an attack was made upon the incumbent councilmen which accused them of being tools of Louis Oneal, the local "boss." This "property owner" commented that the election would demonstrate

... whether the people of San Jose want boss rule or popular rule; whether the jobs of the city hall shall go to henchmen who do nothing for their pay but politics for their master, or to be clean capable men who are good citizens and are accustomed only to a fair wage for fair service.¹⁵

This author further castigated the opposition in the same article by accusing the "Oneal henchmen" of controlling the police and fire commission, of closing the Chinese lotteries and gambling places and then opening others from which they would reap larger profits. Most of the attack upon Oneal and his "gang" was not supported by specific details of the alleged corruption. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to determine from this and other articles what actually took place. Undoubtedly corruption within the community was widespread, but why the reformers were not more specific in their attack remains a mystery. For that matter, they could have attempted prosecution because the incumbent police judge was on the reformer's own ticket, so he was presumably uncorrupted and acceptable to them. It appears that those attacks were primarily campaign rhetoric and possibly mere presumptions on the part of the reformers.

In any event, only the Municipal Conference ticket, headed by a reform incumbent councilman, Fred R. Husted, was given space in *San Jose Mercury*, April 2, 1916, Page Fourteen

Shall Fate of the New Charter Be Left to Politicians?

The power of the four men in the majority control of the next San Jose Council is such that, wielded by "politicians for profit," they could insure to themselves a "harvest" the like of which has never before been known in San Jose.

If you care about your city, vote for the four unpledged, unhampered candidates, Atkinson, Chase, O'Brien and Shaw, because they are interested in the New Charter solely for the things the New Charter can be made to achieve for the betterment of All, ALL, ALL the people of San Jose.

The New Charter Club

(a non-political, constructive organization)

VOTERS, BEWARE OF THE POLITICIANS!

"Should your new charter fall into the hands of politicians, there is only one power that can help you, and that is God Almighty."—Prof. Reed, author of charter, in speech in this city on Wednesday evening.

San Jose Mercury, April 22, 1916, Page One

the *Mercury-Herald* to expound its views on what city government should and could be like. Dean J. H. Campbell of the law department at the University of Santa Clara and a supporter of the Municipal Conference ticket, discussed "what is the matter with San Jose?" He recounted the numerous attributes of San Jose; climate, scenery, geographical position, all of which he considered to be the best in the world. And yet, said Dean Campbell, "we are the jest of the state." He suggested that all the major cities in the state had once "hoped to emulate this city in growth and progress." But he added, "see how they have outstripped us in the race, and continue to outstrip us. What is the matter? It is simply our rotten politics." The Dean continued his catalogue of ills:

San Jose stood for 30 years past in the front rank of political iniquity. There is no practice so vile, to deprive the people of their choice and to corrupt politics and debauch voters that it has not been tried, in this city. What is it that brought about the present state in San Jose? One of the things is the possibility of putting men in office by a minority vote. That is what gives the boss and the gangster his power. A man so elected does not represent the majority; he represents a minority, and a corrupt minority at that, that is, the gang.

Members of the reform ticket, including Dr. A. C. Jayet, J. J. McLauren and Ben Sellers also made similar statements about their concern for San Jose. "Honest Ben" Sellers went so far as to avow: "I have nothing to offer you except my services. I am willing to sacrifice my business to serve the city two years and help make it what it should be."¹⁷ These remarks were typical of the campaign speeches that covered the front pages of the *Mercury-Herald* during the two week period prior to the election. Also typical was the Municipal Conference group equation of the opposition with corruption while pushing their own ticket as being honest and the true representatives of the people.

The Conference ticket published its platform in the *Mercury-Herald*. Its priorities were clear. "San Jose must be free" the reformers proclaimed, "and we consecrate ourselves and our candidates to the task of ridding the city of boss rule and its attendant evils. To that end," the reformers added,

We also strongly recommend the adoption of the four amendments proposed by the Citizens' Charter committee, namely, the preferential primary, the recall, initiative, and referendum, and we include the proposed amendment giving a weekly rest day to city employees.¹⁸

The most important aspect of their platform included their favoring "the adoption of a new charter of the commission business-manager plan." The reformers further indicated that they hoped that "it may be ratified by the legislature in 1915."¹⁹ After their election in May of 1914, the victorious reform ticket quickly pursued this specific aim, for in February of the following year an election was held to elect freeholders to adopt a new charter for San Jose. The importance of the 1914 election cannot be over-

emphasized, for the reformers' victory was instrumental in the subsequent development of San Jose. The city government now was controlled by the reformers, who quickly pursued their stated plan to install a more businesslike charter in San Jose, thus ridding the city of what they considered "corruption" and "boss rule" politics.

THE FREEHOLDERS ELECTION

Although the reformers gained power in 1914, their victory was not so overwhelming as to guarantee their complete control over the coming freeholders election. Consequently a concentrated publicity drive was mounted via the *Mercury-Herald* through editorials and individual articles provided by members of the Citizens' Charter Committee. The reformers were now settled in their minds as to what type of city government was best for San Jose. Greatly influenced by the ideas and articles of University of California Political Science Professor Thomas H. Reed, the reformers decided to promote the city manager type of government over the much discussed commission form, since the former best exemplified their interest in the efficiency and expertise of business managers.

Reed apparently convinced the reformers that the commission government plan met only part of the requirement needed to achieve an efficient and uncorrupt government. He agreed that the commission "system has resulted in establishing our city government upon an honest basis," but commissioners were not experts in their fields. "They are amateurs in the art of administration," said Reed, and in "the business of government, amateurs cannot successfully compete with professionals." For small cities, especially, suggested Reed, a "more satisfactory" expression "of the demand for expert service, is the City Manager."²⁰

"The administrator" said Reed, "has no concern with 'policy,' except to offer such suggestions and advice as his experience warrants. The administrator's relation to the people," Reed continued, "is the same that is borne by the general manager and other principal executive officers of a corporation to its stockholders." Therefore the administrator "should be appointed, not elected, and should be removed as far as possible from the immediate effects of public opinion."²¹ With the same thought in mind, the Citizens' Charter Committee advised cynics,

... to look around, where they will see that practically all large successful business concerns in San Jose are governed by a charter which directs that the stockholders (the people) shall elect a board of directors (a board of councilmen) who shall employ a president or manager, one or both.²²

In their publicity drive prior to the freeholders election, the reformers demanded that San Jose include in its plans for a new charter the adoption of a city manager who would direct the city's affairs in the same way that a general manager might direct corporate policy. They further suggested, like Reed, that this "expert" not be subject to recall or election by the populace. As one article stated, "the people, the voters, cannot know the fitness or lack of

San Jose Mercury, May 13, 1914, Page One

PERSONALITIES ARE MADE SUBORDINATE TO PRINCIPLES

VOTE FOR FOUR GOOD BUSINESS MEN

A LARGE tax-payer and a prominent business man of this city, discussing the local political situation on Wednesday, said he expected to vote for the entire Charter Club ticket.

San Jose Mercury, April 27, 1916, Page One



CHARLES M. O'BRIEN



W. L. ATKINSON



E. E. CHASE



ELTON S. SHAW

O'Brien, Atkinson,
Chase and Shaw

These Men and the New
Charter Will Bring San
Jose Into Her Own

**REGISTER
NOW!**

So You Can Help

**ELECT THEM AT
THE PRIMARY**

—THE NEW CHARTER CLUB

San Jose Mercury, March 10, 1916, Page Fourteen

fitness of the candidates who would aspire to be elected to that important position."²³ In addition to their blunt evaluation of popular democracy, the reformers also repeated a metaphor often heard during the Progressive Era:

The corporation called San Jose is composed of 15,000 stockholders (electors). If the charter required them to elect a business manager they would almost certainly make a botch of it.²⁴

Members of the Charter Committee were convinced that if "the manager must act under and by the authority of . . . [the council],

then in the very nature of municipal government the manager should be an employee of the council—not an elected officer."²⁵ With these ideas and goals in mind, the reform administration in conjunction with members of the Citizens' Charter Committee selected a group of candidates to present to the public for approval in the ensuing February election. Each candidate was interviewed and expected to give a pledge to uphold and support the new charter that was prepared by members of the Citizens' Charter Committee and their "expert," Thomas H. Reed.²⁶

The opposition to the new charter plan came from a long time labor leader and former councilman, Walter G. Mathewson. Mathewson conceded to the idea of charter revision or reform but objected to the Charter Committee's cut and dried method of writing the new document. He called for further discussion and debate and the removal of the pledge that bound candidates to the total support of the charter.²⁷ Totally committed to the abilities of their "expert," the Charter Committee refused debate and would only allow members of labor to place themselves as Committee-endorsed candidates if they pledged support for the document. As can be expected the opposition refused, thereby forcing Mathewson to challenge the Committee by placing his own candidates on the ballot.

The independent candidates and their supporters raised numerous questions about the proposed charter. Their main objection to the "Reed charter" was, surprisingly, published by the *Mercury-Herald* a week prior to the election. Taking advantage of the newspaper's unusual generosity toward individuals opposed to its views, Mathewson outlined his position which clearly indicates that his objections were focused upon the role of the city manager in local government. Unlike the reformers, Mathewson could not foresee that a successful businessman would give "up that business and accept the responsibility of managing the affairs of the city if his position was for a given term" and be subject to the control of a majority of the council "who are themselves compelled to play politics to hold their position." Mathewson stated that he did not condemn the business manager system, "if that system was one where the manager was absolutely independent of the council and subject only to the will of the people." He further added that "the people as a whole would rather retain their right to select their own officers."²⁸ What Mathewson feared was the loss of representation and control by the people over the affairs of the city. He felt that a business manager might well promote efficiency but that he should be subject to recall by the populace.

Another member of the opposition, L. C. DeCarli, objected to the increased number of officers that were to be appointed instead of elected. He also opposed the failure of the new charter to limit bond indebtedness to five percent, and "to the clause giving into the hands of the school board sole authority at any time that it desires to make a demand upon the city authorities for a rate of 25 percent additional taxes for school purposes, such compliance being mandatory."²⁹

Since the Citizens' Charter Committee and members of Mathewson's group could not come to an agreement, both groups entered candidates in the February election. The reformers were basically businessmen who wanted local government to be in control of members of their own class who equated business efficiency with public interest. The opposition, although having members from the business or more wealthy class, appeared, for the most part, to represent members of labor and the lower classes. Under the new proposal they had the most to lose; the right to participate in local affairs, unlike the reformers who had everything to gain since the new city official was to be a business "expert."

It is interesting to note that the reformers attacked their opponents as being members of "boss rule" politics and not as representing the total community but only "minority" interests. The *Mercury-Herald* in answering the question why certain individuals opposed the "Reed Charter" revealed more about the reformers themselves than about their opponents. In one article, written a few days prior to the election, the *Mercury* argued that "the old line politicians" were men "schooled in the art of minority and boss rule." The *Mercury*, further attempted to explain that they "came in at the last moment and placed in the field an opposition ticket, thereby seeking to control the election of freeholders, who are to prepare a new charter, the instrument that is to guide and direct destinies of San Jose." Conceding that the opposition were "representative citizens," the *Mercury*, however, believed that they were not fit to be freeholders because "it is evident that they have not waked up to the fact that business methods can be applied to city government."³⁰

The reformers' substitution of one minority for another is exemplified by their conduct in presenting candidates to the public

which disallowed any debate or discussion over the proposed charter. They specifically wanted the city manager free from public control so he could conduct his affairs unrestrained. An important question arises however: how could the populace be qualified to pick men to serve as councilmen and yet not be qualified to select the city manager appointed by those councilmen? The reformers, of course, advised the populace to elect only qualified businessmen as councilmen thereby ensuring the selection of the right city manager.

THE CHARTER

Despite the relatively strong opposition, the reformers were elected as freeholders on February 4, 1915. The new charter was approved by the people in April of the same year and passed on to the state legislature for final approval. Reformers W. L. Atkinson, Elmer E. Chase, Charles M. O'Brien and Elton Shaw were all elected to the new council in 1916. Also elected to the expanded council were three Municipal Conference ticket incumbents from 1914, A. C. Jayet, J. F. McLaurin and Ben Sellers. Atkinson, Chase and O'Brien were all members of the freeholders elected in 1915, while Shaw served as a fire and police commissioner between 1914-15. These men, as expected, unanimously appointed Thomas H. Reed as the city's first City Manager.³¹ Reed held office for two years before returning to Berkeley to continue his work on municipal management.

A comparative analysis of the two charters will give a more complete and better understanding as to the nature of change that occurred in 1916 and the effect it had upon overall community representation. The only significant amendments added to the old charter were approved in 1914 when the preferential primary, the recall, referendum and the initiative were placed into the old document. The old charter, dating back to 1897, provided for a mayor, treasurer, and city clerk to be elected by the people for two year terms. The mayor was restricted to serving only two consecutive terms. In addition, five councilmen were elected for four years with one councilman serving the city at-large while the remainder represented their respective wards. Although the ward representatives had to reside in their ward districts, they were elected by the total community. The mayor had the power to appoint all the high city officials (whose terms expired during his tenure) with the consent of the common council. Included among these appointments were five member boards of Health, Education, Free Public Library Trustees, Park Commissioners and boards of police and fire commissioners who all served without compensation. The appointed salaried officials who received decent pay (ranging from \$1200-\$2,000 annually) included the city attorney, chief of police, city engineer and street superintendent.³²

The new charter replaced the elected mayor with a high salaried city manager, who became responsible for directing city policy and preparing the annual budget. He was appointed and subject to recall only by the common council. He had the absolute power to appoint most of the city's officials without the consent of the council. He was granted the power to appoint his own city treasurer, who was previously elected. He was restricted only in his appointment of the chiefs of fire and police in that he had to

choose candidates presented by the city's Civil Service Commission.³³

In contrast to the old charter, the seven councilmen lost most of their appointment powers to the city manager. They retained the right to appoint only the city clerk (who was elected under the old charter) and three member boards of the Civil Service Commission and the City Planning Commission. None of the new councilmen were elected from wards and they now served six year terms instead of four.³⁴ These officials were not paid well, in fact, they were given less than under the old charter. This is extremely significant, for the new positions were now more likely to be restricted to members of the community who had an independent source of income. As a result the first elected officials were all businessmen who clearly represented a single class or strata of society. It is also significant that the board members appointed by the council or city manager all served without compensation, thus again restricting membership to the more wealthy or leisure class. The only officials receiving high salaries were the "experts" which included the City Attorney, City Engineer, and, of course, the City Manager.

EVALUATION

During the Progressive Era San Jose was expected to expand and adopt many of the new technological innovations that were generally being accepted across the nation. The need to create an efficient local government that could provide these community services rapidly became apparent. The old charter, the reformers felt, inhibited the local officials from making rapid progress because it allowed for too much discussion and debate among the different elements of the community. A new up-to-date charter seemed to be the only answer to accommodate rapid change and potential growth. These businessmen reformers foresaw the possible stagnation of economic development unless the community was able to expand and attract new business and industry. In order to prosper themselves; they felt that the community must be made to attract others. With these ideas in mind, the reformers became quite willing to sacrifice popular representation in order to gain the much needed efficiency. They finally achieved their goal in 1916 when the city adopted its first business manager charter.

The consequences that resulted from the framing of that charter under the city manager plan became readily apparent. Popular control over civic affairs was effectively curtailed with the elimination of the city's most important public official from the control of the electorate and by the elimination of the ward system of representation. These changes ensured that only the business class was elected to the city council. Since the council was to appoint the most important man in city government—the city manager—the council must therefore consist of those most qualified to pick the right man. The results, of course, left much of the populace practically void of a political voice in local affairs since only members of a certain segment of the community determined what was good for all. The people of San Jose, as in many other parts of the nation during the Progressive Era, were led to believe that efficiency in government was much more important than their right to equal representation.

San Jose Mercury, April 23, 1916, Page Ten

Let Us Put San Jose Into the Hands of Her Very Best Businessmen

—Is There Anything Wrong About That?

Let us elect Councilmen to office who believe the industrial condition of San Jose should be improved to better the laboring conditions in San Jose. Labor is entitled to steady employment.

—Is there anything wrong about that?

Let us have Councilmen in office who believe in the separation of grade crossings; who pledge themselves to submit to a vote of the people the franchise demands of the Southern Pacific Company on the West Side and the Fourth Street line on the East Side.

—Is there anything wrong about that?

Let us have Councilmen who believe San Jose should develop water terminals and port facilities, thereby forcing the Southern Pacific Company to restore terminal rates, which we no longer enjoy and to maintain lowest rates between San Jose and San Francisco.

—Is there anything wrong about that?

Let us have Councilmen who believe in the equalization of taxation.

—Is there anything wrong about that?

Let us have Councilmen who believe in a man for City Manager who is thoroughly competent and by enough a temporary committee the answer at the office.

—Is there anything wrong about that?

Let Us Elect Chase, O'Brien, Shaw and Atkinson
to Do These Things

The Temperate Progressives of Santa Cruz, 1906-1916

Philip Wright and Jon Gundersgaard

Prior to 1866 the city of Santa Cruz was not recognized by the state of California as a "legal" city since it had never incorporated itself. There had never been a need for any clear form of municipal government since Santa Cruz was a small agricultural town. But in 1866 Santa Cruz inhabitants saw a need for some type of city government in response to the increasing population. In order to have an effective and legal city government Santa Cruz needed to be incorporated.

In 1866 a document was drawn up and corporate powers were vested in a Board of Trustees which consisted of three members elected by the qualified voters of Santa Cruz. The Board was given power to: create by-laws for the operation of the city; to levy and collect annually a tax on all real property, and to impose and collect a poll tax annually on every male inhabitant of twenty-one years of age and over; to pass and regulate other laws and police the town as "they deem[ed] necessary;" and to appoint an Assessor, a Marshall, a Tax Collector and a Road Master. Although the document was composed in 1866 it was not until 1876 that it was ratified by the state legislature.

Until 1907 the city of Santa Cruz operated under the 1866 charter (in 1902 a new charter was proposed but defeated). In August, 1906, fifteen freeholders were elected by the voters of Santa Cruz out of thirty candidates for the purpose of writing a "new and up-to-date" charter.

Prior to the new charter, Santa Cruz was divided into seven wards. Three of these wards were located in newly annexed east Santa Cruz. But no citizens from there could run for the position of freeholder due to a five year residency requirement for all office holders in city government. It was feared by the people of Santa Cruz that the charter might become null and void if "illegal east Santa Cruz residents were on the Board forming the new charter."¹ The residents of three of the city's seven wards were thus temporarily disfranchised.

The freeholder's election was a relatively cut-and-dried affair. Only attorney C. M. Cassis and Duncan McPherson, the *Santa Cruz Sentinel* publisher, bothered to campaign actively. And the only controversy came after the election when Samuel Leask, a prominent local Republican and dry goods merchant and a Chamber of Commerce member, criticized McPherson for using "his newspaper for the publication of arguments which he had not first advanced" to a meeting of the freeholders.²

C. D. Hinkle, a local merchant, received the most votes in the 1906 election and was elected president, (by his own colleagues), of the Board of Freeholders. Thus, the 1907 charter became known as the "Hinkle Charter." Hinkle was typical of the new board. Most were businessmen who were also members of the Chamber of Commerce.

At one meeting, to draft the new charter, McPherson suggested the adoption of the initiative, referendum, and the recall. The recall, a popular Progressive Era reform in many other communities, was not well-received by the Santa Cruz freeholders. They argued that office holders could accomplish very little under the constant threat of being recalled and that it would unduly "harrass men who are elected to office to use their best judgment in legislating for the interests of the people."³ It was decided to submit the recall to the voters as a separate proposition. The referendum and the initiative, however, were adopted by the Board and incorporated into the charter.

Briefly, the 1907 charter provided for the following: there was to be a paid Mayor (\$600 annually) elected by the voters and to serve for a term of two years, and seven City Council members elected from the respective wards of the city every two years; the Mayor was to preside at the meetings of the City Council, but he was not entitled to vote; the Mayor had general supervision over all of the city departments and had the power to appoint (with council consent) those minor officers of the city who were not

elected by the voters or whose appointment was not specifically provided for in the charter; the remaining members of city government, who were to be elected every two years, were the City Attorney, the Police Judge, the Chief of Police, the Superintendent of Streets and Parks and members of the Board of Education. It was decided that the Superintendent of Schools should "devote his entire time to the duties of his office" and be appointed annually by the Board of Education.⁴ The Board of Education was to have three members elected from the Santa Cruz school district at large, and they were to serve without compensation. In partial response to the opposition from the people of the exceptionally long residency requirement for city office holders it was reduced from the previous five years to three years, but all residents had to reside within the city for a period of thirty days to become voters.

The charter of 1907 made some changes in Santa Cruz government. The Mayor and City Councilmen provided for a more democratic representation of the people due to the Councilmen representing the wards of the city, and the responsibility of a more effective and efficient government could now be placed on a larger body of men. And, lastly, it allowed municipal government in Santa Cruz, with the recall, initiative and referendum, to function in a manner similar to other larger city governments operating under the same basic form of city government.

A special municipal election was held on January 22, 1907 when the finished charter was presented to the voters of Santa Cruz. The total vote polled was 869 out of over 2,000 eligible voters or about forty-three percent. The charter and all its propositions passed by a margin of five to one.⁵ One unnamed prominent merchant stated, "I believe that it would be possible to frame a better charter, but we must have a new charter, and I am going to vote yea. . . ."⁶ The Hinkle Charter of 1907 was ratified on February 23, 1907 by the California State Legislature. But only a few years later Santa Cruz businessmen—inspired by Progressive activities in other communities—began to push for a new charter. They desired a "more efficient form of municipal government" that would be run by experts.

The movement for a new charter came to focus on the commission form of government. On October 23, 1910, Colonel William Lucas, a prominent local Republican, wrote a letter to the *Santa Cruz Sentinel* saying that he fully endorsed the commission form of Government on the Galveston, Texas, model and that it should be the only form considered in a new charter.⁷ Lucas labeled it a "new and revolutionary scheme," and called upon all candidates for freeholders to profess publicly whether they agreed or not in supporting this "revolutionary" form of government. He also called upon the voters to judge all freeholder candidates on their merits as businessmen. The only freeholder candidate to reply was Samuel Leask, who stated that, although not committing himself to any single type of government, he did favor a concentration of responsibilities so that each official could be held "strictly accountable" for his own field. Leask also favored an end to the ward system and the appointment of all city officials to positions needing "special knowledge or technical skill." He thought the people were more "successful in recognizing in their candidates such qualities as character and judgment, than in passing upon their qualifications for special work of a technical nature."⁸ Leask summed up by stating that he thought it was possible to have too many "checks and restrictions" and they "impeded" action and progress.⁹ Another freeholder candidate, attorney W. R. Springer, advocated a commission form of government because it "eliminated political parties and the political boss in municipal affairs." Springer continued:

It gives us a small Council with large powers and full responsibility.

It abolishes wards and elects its representatives at large.

It gives us the initiative and ultimate vote of the people. It

brings more harmony into the various departments of the city government.¹⁰

The voters agreed with Colonel Lucas's call for businessman-freeholders. Out of the fifteen freeholders, ten of those elected were members of the Chamber of Commerce, of whom nine were businessmen.¹¹ Also, ten of the newly elected freeholders were former members of the Board of Freeholders that had prepared the 1907 charter. Leask, who acquired the most votes, was elected president of the freeholders.

The new city charter drew heavily on the experience of other cities with the commission form of government, especially Berkeley, California, and Des Moines, Iowa. Mayor Beverly Hodgehead of Berkeley, came to Santa Cruz to speak on the advantages of the commission form of government.¹² Freeholder President Leask cited the Des Moines plan as being unique due to the fact that its municipality was centralized in a council composed of a Mayor and four Commissioners. Colonel Lucas concurred with this and, being from Iowa, was seemingly very familiar with the Des Moines system. The general conclusion was that "the Commission form was a simplified method of transacting the business of the city: to do business by business methods without so much red tape."¹³

The public was allowed to attend the meetings of the freeholders, but the stringent rules imposed by the freeholders did not allow visitors to voice any opinions. This rule could be suspended by a two-thirds vote of the freeholder members present. However, with the rule in force, any suggestions to be made by the audience were to be made in writing and filed with the secretary. The freeholders' devotion to the public interest clearly did not include a public voice in freeholder proceedings.

As contrasted to the 1907 charter, under the 1911 charter the Mayor and four Commissioners (Revenue and Finance; Public Health and Safety; Public Works; and Streets and Parks) were to be elected by the voters at large with the Commissioners having more power than the former seven councilmen. The Mayor now had the right to vote with the Commissioners at the city council meetings and was to serve for a term of two years with the salary of \$1,200 annually, a \$600 annual increase. Also, the minimum age for the mayor was reduced from thirty years of age to twenty-five. The Commissioners were to serve for a term of four years—a two year increase on their term—with a salary of \$600 annually which represented a \$300 annual increase. The Board of Education was increased from three members to five members with each serving a term of four years. The annual reappointment of the Superintendent was unchanged. The Mayor had authority over all departments of city government that were not under the direct supervision of the Commissioners—such as the Tax Collector, City Treasurer, and the police.¹⁴

In the 1911 charter the Mayor now had more power than was previously afforded to him, and because the Commissioners now had direct responsibility for their respective offices, a more streamlined and efficient administration would be able to manage the city's governmental affairs. The increase in salary for the office of Mayor and Commissioners was at best intended to encourage professionals (who were accustomed to being paid for their services) to seek these offices, thus broadening the field of applicants and drawing on a wider range of "experts." Also, the handling of the city's school system was now strengthened by a larger membership in the Board of Trustees and a Superintendent of Schools who would continue to devote his full time to the office.

The reform fervor died down somewhat during the next three years and there was seemingly little public reaction or interest when petitions were passed for a new charter in 1914. Only sixteen candidates ran for the necessary fifteen freeholder positions and a light voter turnout elected the fifteen to office with the new charter. Curiously, only one man, W. R. Springer, had been a part of the group responsible for writing the 1911 charter.

What the 1914 Board of Freeholders produced was a hodge-podge of Progressive Era reforms and anti-Progressive reaction. It called for a retention of the four Commissioners elected by the entire city but added that the four Commissioners had to represent the four wards of the city. It called for an extension of democracy by making the appointive offices of City Clerk, Treasurer, Police Judge and three Park Commissioners elective and by cutting the Commissioners' terms from four years to two years; but cut democracy by eliminating primary elections. It reduced the annual salaries of the Mayor from \$1,200 to \$900 and the Commissioners from \$600 to \$300, but raised the salary of the Police Judge from \$50 a month plus one-half of all the fines he collected. It also called for the collection of city taxes by the county administration because it was considered more efficient. The Health Officer and

Chief of Police were merged and appointed by the Mayor.

The reasoning of those advocating the new charter was that it would save the city money. The centralized tax collection, lower salaries and elimination of the primary were seen as ways to economize.

Though the 1914 charter movement had caused practically no stir at all before the new charter was completed, it later aroused strong opposition. Springer refused to endorse the new charter and led the fight to have it defeated. He wrote articles to the local newspapers attacking the new charter as regressive because it would return to the ward system, it was anti-democratic because of the loss of the primary, inefficient because the lower salaries would result in less time spent on the job by city officials and inappropriate because the commission form of government was working out its "bugs" and was finally to a point where it could operate efficiently. Other attacks were made on the new charter because it caused the loss of experience by having all four commissioners up for reelection at one time instead of the existing staggered terms, raising the possibility of having four inexperienced commissioners elected simultaneously.¹⁵ The opponents of the charter feared that this would disrupt the cohesion of city government. It was also attacked as giving the Mayor power over appointments in areas directly under the Commissioners and because the merging of the Chief of Police and Health Office would force the city to appoint a "doctor Chief of Police."¹⁶ The opposition also claimed that all city office holders, except the Police Judge, who served to make more money, opposed the charter.¹⁷

The pro-charter forces countered by pointing out that all state and nationally-elected officials ran from specific districts, that the city always had plenty of office seekers no matter what the salary (and that the city was being by-passed by tourism because present Government had let the city, and especially the city streets, run down). Their arguments were to no avail. The charter was defeated in a light turnout of voters with 775 in favor and 1426 opposed.

After the 1914 failure the movement for a new charter did not die immediately. Mayor Drullard had appointed a committee to recommend charter changes even before the abortive 1914 movement and this committee continued its work after the referendum. On October 23, 1914, the committee recommended to the mayor and city council that the charter be revised so that the city would be governed by five Commissioners elected at large for a term of four years with two elected in one election and three two years later. It also called for a reduced salary of \$300 a year for each Commissioner and for all appointive city officials to be appointed by the Commissioners. These reforms were never implemented nor voted on by the people.

The only other concerted attempt to change the charter took place in 1916 when a Chamber of Commerce Committee to study charter revisions recommended the introduction of the city manager form of government. This recommendation was also ignored.

The Commission form of government survived in Santa Cruz until 1947 even though it was found to be unworkable. As reform leader Leask recalled in 1955, "In a few years literal compliance with the commission idea was found to be impossible, and by general consent the business of the city was conducted for many years on the ordinary plan of a mayor and council although the charter, with a few amendments of details, continued to be the basic law of the city from 1911 to 1947."¹⁸

Progressivism, though much discussed in Santa Cruz, never took on the dynamic proportions that it did in some of California's larger cities. The Santa Cruz of the early twentieth century was predominantly a tourist town with no large industry and seems not to have had any significant labor movement. Its political structure during the Progressive Era was controlled solely by local business interests and its political struggles were merely debates over which businessmen should control and which ideas would most efficiently govern the city for the benefit of these local business interests. There was no system of political bossism to throw out and no noticeable amounts of graft. Municipal reform was pursued because it was seen as a way to make city government run efficiently and economically. The reformers' political rhetoric centered on improved streets, expanded tourism and lower taxes and never on the need to oust an existing establishment. The movements for new charters, especially in 1911, showed strong Progressive Era tendencies but these seem to have come more from the osmosis of ideas from outside than from a need for political upheaval within Santa Cruz itself. When the Commission form of government failed to bring the efficiency its advocates had hoped for, they simply abandoned it in practice and continued on spurning other Progressive Era governmental innovations until the institution of the city manager in 1947.

Footnotes

INTRODUCTION

By DAVID W. EAKINS

1. Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities* (New York: Sagamore Press ed., 1957), pp. 3-4.
2. U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D. C., 1960), pp. 590, 420, 462, 459, 461.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 12; William F. James and George H. McMurray, *History of San Jose* (San Jose, California: Smith Printing Co., 1933), pp. 132, 139.

THE DISCOVERY OF CORRUPTION AS A PUBLIC ISSUE: THE GOOD GOVERNMENT LEAGUE AND THE MACHINE IN SAN JOSE, 1896-1902

By JOHN HERBERICH and PATRICIA K. CANNON

1. Primary sources in the research of this study were local newspapers and two ledgers containing the complete minutes of the Good Government League.
2. An article appearing in the Los Angeles *Daily Times* on September 3, 1901, compared San Jose with the biblical Sodom. The article was later linked to the Hayes publications. *Evening News*, December 24, 1901, p. 5.
3. George Mowry, *The California Progressives* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1951), p. 15.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
5. William F. James, George H. McMurray, *The History of San Jose* (San Jose, California: Smith Publishing Co., 1933), p. 127.
6. Spencer C. Olin, *California's Prodigal Sons; Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, 1911-1917* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 191.
7. *Herald*, May 9, 1902. A front page political cartoon personified the San Jose "machine" as wielding a large "California" club against small businessmen. Some members of the California Club are mentioned in the *Evening News*, May 17, 1902, p. 5.
8. Editorial, *San Jose Mercury*, May 11, 1908, p. 1.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Good Government League Ledger*, Vol. II (San Jose Historical Museum). Hereafter referred to as the *G. G. L. L.* Due to the condition of the Ledgers it is not always possible to cite page references.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 15.
14. Eugene V. Sawyer, *History of San Jose with Biographical Sketches*. (Los Angeles: Historical Record Co., 1922), pp. 324-27.
15. *Herald*, May 11, 1908, p. 1; *G. G. L. L.*, Vol. II, p. 12.
16. *Herald*, May 12, 1900, p. 2.
17. Political advertisement, *Herald*, April 6, 1898, p. 4.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Editorial, *Herald*, April 1, 1898, p. 4.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Herald*, May 12, 1900, p. 2.

22. *Herald*, February 7, 1898, p. 8.

23. *G. G. L. L.*, Vol. I., insert.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Herald*, February 14, 1898, p. 8.

26. *G. G. L. L.*, *Op. Cit.*

27. Editorial, *Herald*, November 18, 1898.

28. *Herald*, November 28, 1898, p. 4. In an editorial comment the same day the *Herald* voiced its opposition to kindergarten and noted with pleasure that the Board of Education had dispensed with the services of the special teachers of "physical culture, reading, drawing and music effecting a savings of \$335 per month." They expressed hope that once gone, these "frivolities" would never return.

29. A particular case of interest is Campbell vs. Harrington as mentioned in the *G. G. L. L.*, Vol. I, p. 163.

30. They were assisted by a strongly worded publication put out by the Santa Clara County Contesting Delegation which documents 15 alleged "crimes and outrages . . . perpetrated on the Republican Party through the infernal machinations of a Boss and a County Committee . . . and a machine held together by the cohesive power of public plunder."

Another organization, the San Jose Ministerial Union published an open letter contesting the "intimidation, irregular voting and gross frauds [that] were perpetrated by the political ring under the lead of the 'boss', Jas. W. Rea . . ." Documents found in *G. G. L. L.*

31. *Herald*, November 11, 1898, p. 8. Rea received 822 votes to 718 for G. G. L. candidate Phelps. At this time the *Herald* remarked that, ". . . Rea must certainly feel cut down. Phelps frightened him within an inch of his life."

32. The Hayes brother had a previous interest in San Jose publications, allegedly contributing financial support to the *Times*, *Better Times* and *Phoenix*, to the sum of \$40,000, "while those newspapers were staggering around on their last legs looking for a place to fall." As reported in the *Evening News*, December 26, 1900, p. 4.

33. *Herald*, January 9, 1901, p. 4.

34. *G. G. L. L.*, Vol. II.

THE WORSWICK REFORMERS AND "THE PUSH," 1902-1904

By RICHARD C. WAKEFIELD

1. *San Jose Mercury*, April 20, 1904, p. 1.
2. *Mercury*, April 23, 1902, p. 1.
3. *Mercury*, April 3, 1902, p. 1.
4. *Mercury*, April 12, 1902, p. 4.
5. *Mercury*, April 26, 1902, p. 3.
6. *Mercury*, May 2, 1902, p. 1.
7. *Mercury*, May 22, 1902 reprinted from the *San Francisco Call*, May 21, 1902; *Mercury*, April 22, 1902, p. 5.
8. *Mercury*, May 19, 1902, p. 1.
9. *Mercury*, April 3, 1902, p. 3.
10. *Mercury*, April 17, 1902, p. 4.
11. *Mercury*, April 3, 1902, p. 1.
12. *Mercury*, April 7, 1902, p. 5.

13. *Mercury*, April 19, 1902, p. 1.
14. *Mercury*, April 5, 1902, p. 2.
15. *Mercury*, May 22, 1902, p. 4; reprinted from the *San Francisco Call*, May 21, 1902.
16. *Mercury*, March 23, 1902, p. 8.
17. *Oakland Enquirer*, May 21, 1902, cited in the *Mercury*, May 22, 1902, p. 4. It was the observation of the *Fresno Republican* on May 20, 1902, that Rea was a handicap to the citizens' ticket, rather than an asset. It is my opinion, however, that Rea was a definite plus for that ticket.
18. *Mercury*, May 23, 1902, p. 2.
19. *Mercury*, April 20, 1902, p. 4.
20. *Mercury*, April 9, 1902, p. 4.
21. *Mercury*, April 29, 1902, p. 1.
22. *Mercury*, May 11, 1902, pp. 1 and 4.
23. *Mercury*, February 14, 1903, p. 4; February 16, 1903; p. 4; February 19, 1903, p. 1.
24. *Mercury*, April 5, 1904, p. 1. These figures were taken from a post office department survey according to the *Mercury*. They do not coincide with the figures from other sources. It would appear that these figures were used to increase Worswick's chances of re-election.
25. *Mercury*, May 1, 1904, p. 1.
26. *Mercury*, April 6, 1904, p. 1.
27. *Mercury*, April 25, 1904, p. 1.
28. *Mercury*, April 14, 1904, p. 1.
29. *Mercury*, April 28, 1904, p. 4; May 4, 1904, p. 1; May 5, 1904, p. 1.
30. *Mercury*, April 30, 1904, p. 1.
31. *Mercury*, April 9, 1904, p. 1.
32. *Mercury*, February 16, 1903, p. 4; February 19, 1903, p. 3.
33. *Mercury*, February 19, 1903, p. 4.

**CENTRALIZATION AND EFFICIENCY:
THE REFORMERS SHAPE MODERN SAN JOSE
SAN JOSE GOVERNMENT, 1910-1916**

By VALERIE ELLSWORTH and ANDREW J. GARBELY

1. *San Jose Mercury-Herald*, March 7, 1913, p. 4; May 5, 1910.
2. Mabel L. Hammett, "The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating," *The American City*, Vol. XVIII No. 5, May, 1918, p. 426.
3. *Mercury*, April 20, 1912, p. 7.
4. *Ibid.*, May 5, 1910, p. 1.
5. Eugene T. Sawyer, *History of Santa Clara County with Biographical Sketches* (Los Angeles: Historic Record, 1922), p. 844.
6. *Mercury*, January 25, 1915, p. 7.
7. *Ibid.*, May 5, 1910, p. 1.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Carl A. McCandless, *Urban Government and Politics* (St. Louis: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1970), p. 166.
10. *Mercury*, January 5, 1912, p. 7.
11. *Ibid.*, October 9, 1911.
12. *Ibid.*, January 5, 1913, p. 26.
13. *Ibid.*, April 7, 1914, p. 8.
14. *Ibid.*, January 12, 1912.

15. *Mercury*, May 16, 1914, p. 1.
16. *Ibid.*, May 17, 1914, p. 3.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, May 13, 1914, p. 1.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Thomas H. Reed, *Government for the People* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1915), pp. 200-203.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
22. *Mercury*, January 30, 1915, p. 7.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*, January 8, 1915, p. 1.
27. *Ibid.*, January 13, 1915, p. 1.
28. *Ibid.*, January 25, 1915, p. 7.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
30. *Ibid.*, February 1, 1915, p. 7.
31. Sawyer, *Santa Clara County*, pp. 174-75.
32. *San Jose City Charter*, 1897.
33. *San Jose City Charter*, 1916.
34. *Ibid.*

**THE TEMPERATE PROGRESSIVES OF
SANTA CRUZ, 1906-1916**
By PHILIP WRIGHT and JON GUNDERSGAARD

1. *Santa Cruz Sentinel*, July 28, 1906, p. 1.
2. *Ibid.*, October 30, 1906, p. 3. McPherson was more sharply criticized during the preparation of the 1911 charter when an opposition newspaper, *The Surf*, commented that "with some notable exceptions we do not consider lawyers and editors good charter makers." *The Surf* was referring to McPherson. *The Surf*, October 27, 1910, p. 2.
3. *Santa Cruz Sentinel*, August 25, 1906, p. 1.
4. *Ibid.*, September 26, 1906, p. 1.
5. *Minutes of the Commission Council, Santa Cruz, California*, p. 222.
6. *Santa Cruz Sentinel*, January 23, 1907, p. 1.
7. *Ibid.*, October 23, 1910, p. 6. Also, see Robert Burton and Thomas L. McHugh, *Samuel Leask: Transplanted Scot Citizen Par Excellence* (Felton, California: The Village Print Shop, 1964), p. 28.
8. *Santa Cruz Sentinel*, October 30, 1910, p. 8.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, November 2, 1910, p. 1.
11. *Ibid.*, November 4, 1910, p. 1.
12. Hodgehead spoke in Santa Cruz, December 10, 1910. *Ibid.*, December 10, 1910, p. 1.
13. *Ibid.*, November 30, 1910, p. 8.
14. *Santa Cruz City Charter of 1911*.
15. *Santa Cruz Sentinel*, October 4, 1914, p. 2. Unsigned letter to the editor.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, October 6, 1914, p. 2. Editorial.
18. Samuel Leask, *Some Memories of an Uprooted and Transplanted Scot* (n. p., 1955), pp. 180-81.

The Authors

PATRICIA K. CANNON received her M.A. degree last year. She is currently a Social Studies instructor at Soquel High School, Soquel, California.

DAVID W. EAKINS is a Professor of History and Humanities at San Jose State University. He has been teaching there since 1962.

VALERIE ELLSWORTH is currently working for the City of San Jose in the Parks and Recreation Department. She has taught high school as a Social Sciences instructor in several schools in Santa Clara County.

JOSEPH GARBELY received his M.A. degree last year. He is now teaching English in a small mining community (Rafsanjan) in southern Iran.

JON GUNDERSGAARD received his M.A. degree last year. He was then employed for nine months on the campaign of a narrowly unsuccessful candidate for Congress. Since then he has worked

both as a paid, and unpaid, political organizer in Santa Cruz, California.

JOHN L. HERBERICH has completed two years of teaching Social Studies and Math at the Junior High School level and is currently working in the James W. Gerard Papers at the University of Montana in fulfillment of his Master's Thesis. He is also working on some revisionist research in early California history.

RICHARD L. WAKEFIELD is presently employed as a letter carrier in the United States Postal Service in Sunnyvale, California. He is also a vacation replacement supervisor. He has been President of the El Camino Little League for the past two years and has spent the last four years as a football coach in a youth football program.

PHIL WRIGHT earned his M.A. in History last year. He is currently employed by Santa Cruz County as Senior Buyer in the Purchasing Department.



January, 1976
600 Copies

